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in each doctrinal setting can be siloed. This Article rejects that approach,
beginning with its underlying premise. Using contemporary examples, we
demonstrate how the Court’s immigration doctrines dynamically interact
with each other, and with politics, in ways that affect the whole system.
This intervention provides a far more accurate rendering of how
immigration exceptionalism translates into practice. By simultaneously
accounting for rights, federalism, and separation of powers, our model
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dangerously missed. For better and worse, the doctrines of immigration
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration law is famously exceptional. The Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence is littered with special immigration doctrines that depart from
mainstream constitutional norms.1 These doctrines do not apply to other
regulatory fields and enable government action that would be unacceptable

1

See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power,
1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (tracing the Supreme Court’s departures from mainstream norms in
immigration cases); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984) (“Probably no other area of American law has been so radically insulated and divergent from
those fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate
the rest of our legal system.”).
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if applied to citizens. This Article provides the first comprehensive study of
“immigration exceptionalism”2—and with some urgency.
More than ever, the scope of immigration power is coming face-toface with constitutional rights, federalism, and separation of powers.
National security threats have galvanized nativist sentiment, including
proposals to ban immigrants of certain religions and nationalities.3
Meanwhile, congressional gridlock on immigration reform has prompted
the President, states, and cities to take matters into their own hands,
generating new cuts of institutional conflict across all levels of
government.4 With the future of immigration law hanging in the balance,
the doctrines of immigration exceptionalism could be decisive.5
To start, consider the following headline examples:
1. Rights. Weeks before this Article was going to print, President Trump
issued an executive order that temporarily banned the admission of
immigrants from certain predominantly Muslim countries.6 Under the
2

It has long been appreciated that, when it comes to immigration, the normal constitutional rules
do not always apply. See generally infra Parts I–II. But the term for this phenomenon, “immigration
exceptionalism,” made its first literary appearances in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 10, 34 (1990);
Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: Immigration Law and Policy in the 1990s, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1,
19 (1989).
3
See Geoff Earle, Trump’s Poll Numbers Surge After Muslim Ban Comments, N.Y. POST (Dec. 14,
2015), http://nypost.com/2015/12/14/trumps-poll-numbers-surge-after-muslim-ban-comments/ [https://
perma.cc/RN79-S2L9]; Texas Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 3d 706,
714 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (denying Texas’s request for an injunction to suspend the resettlement of Syrian
refugees in the state).
4
See Section I.B (discussing spate of state initiatives in immigration); Section I.C (discussing
executive initiatives in immigration); see also David S. Rubenstein, Self-Help Structuralism, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 1619, 1630–32, 1650–57 (2015) (describing how the President and states have engaged in
“constitutional self-help”); Taking Action on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov
/issues/immigration [https://perma.cc/E5AE-7F3J] (outlining President Obama’s immigration plans and
actions).
5
In his first weeks in office, President Trump issued a series of executive orders concerning
immigration. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No.
13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
Each raises constitutional questions that will fill court dockets in the years to come. For some cases that
are already underway, see Complaint, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485, 2017 WL
412999 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) and infra note 6.
6
See Exec. Order No. 13,769. The litigation over President Trump’s executive order is sprawling.
See, e.g., Louhghalam v. Trump, No. 17-10154-NMG, 2017 WL 479779 (D. Mass. Feb. 3, 2017);
Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 655437 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2017). After being
preliminarily enjoined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, President Trump signed a
revised order, dropping Iraq to reduce the list of covered countries from seven to six. Exec. Order No.
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). Unsurprisingly, litigation over the immigration ban
continues. See Lydia Wheeler, ACLU on Trump’s Revised Travel Ban: ‘Litigation Lives On,’ THE HILL
(Mar. 7, 2017, 1:37 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/322734-aclu-on-trumps-revised-travelban-litigation-lives-on [https://perma.cc/Q3XK-QSXJ].
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Court’s mainstream equal protection and First Amendment doctrines,
discrimination on account of nationality or religion would likely be
unconstitutional.7 But the answer is far less clear under the Court’s
infamous “plenary power doctrine,” which affords the federal
government virtually unchecked power to make immigration
decisions.8
2. Federalism. Can federal immigration enforcement policies preempt
state laws? This question has come to a head in recent years. The past
decade has witnessed an unprecedented uptick in state and local laws
directed at immigrants. Many of these subfederal measures are
“restrictionist” (i.e., they place burdens or restrictions on immigrants);9
other subfederal laws are “integrationist” (i.e., they seek to extend
benefits and a general sense of belonging to immigrants).10 Meanwhile,
the Executive Branch has increasingly made its immigration
enforcement policies publicly known.11 These political developments
make comparisons between federal and subfederal enforcement
preferences ripe for testing under the Supremacy Clause.12 Under the
Court’s mainstream preemption doctrine, only federal statutes and
7

See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 579 (1993) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in the judgment) (“When a law discriminates against religion as such . . . it automatically
will fail strict scrutiny . . . .”); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (“[C]lassifications
based on . . . nationality or race[] are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”
(footnotes omitted)).
8
As mentioned, at the time of publication, litigation over President Trump’s immigration ban is
already quite extensive. See list of cases in supra note 6. For commentary preceding President Trump’s
election, see Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Legality of Muslim Exclusion, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG
(Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-legality-of-muslim-exclusion [https://perma.cc/
L9E9-APY3]; Peter J. Spiro, Trump’s Anti-Muslim Plan Is Awful, and Constitutional, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 8 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/opinion/trumps-anti-muslim-plan-is-awful-andconstitutional.html [https://perma.cc/WAU3-C63T]. But see Kevin R. Johnson, Trump’s Idea on
Muslims Fails, Despite Precedent, NAT’L L. J. (Dec. 21, 2015) (offering an alternative view).
9
For examples, see infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
10
For examples, see infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
11
See, e.g., Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., to León
Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. 1 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter DAPA
Memo],
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MWC3-87ZJ]; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. 1 (Jun. 15, 2012)
[hereinafter DACA Memo], http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/H46N-EHKE] (detailing the Department
of Homeland Security’s plan to exercise prosecutorial discretion with regard to undocumented
immigrants who came to the United States as children); Barack Obama, President, White House,
Remarks by the President on Immigration—Chicago, Illinois (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/25/remarks-president-immigration-chicago-il
[https://perma.cc/3JXP-Y2T8].
12
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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binding administrative action can preempt conflicting state policies.13
In Arizona v. United States, however, the Court strongly indicated (if
not held) that the Executive’s nonbinding enforcement policies could
form the basis of a preemptive conflict and struck down at least one of
Arizona’s restrictionist laws, partially on this ground.14 Now, under the
Trump Administration, can nonbinding executive policies preempt
state integrationist laws too?
3. Separation of Powers. Congress has clear authority to grant legal
reprieve to some or all of the 11 million undocumented immigrants
currently in the country.15 But can the Executive Branch unilaterally
grant temporary legal reprieve and work authorization to large swaths
of this population, as the Obama Administration’s signature “deferred
action” programs contemplate?16 Last term, the Court had an
opportunity to decide this question in United States v. Texas.17 During
oral argument, some Justices expressed concern that the President’s
immigration initiative might invert the conventional congressional–
executive lawmaking model.18 In a telling nod to exceptionalism, the
U.S. Solicitor General replied: “I don’t think [the lawmaking
relationship is] upside down. I think it’s different . . . in recognition . . .
of the unique nature of immigration policy.”19 The Court’s 4–4 split

13

See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–77 (2009) (holding that preamble to regulation,
which was not binding, could not have preemptive effect); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 866 (2000) (holding that an agency regulation with force of law preempted a state tort law claim).
14
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012) (preempting provisions of Arizona’s
S.B. 1070, at least in part because of its potential conflict with federal immigration enforcement
priorities); see also Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (declining to
resolve a similar preemption claim but deeming it “plausible”). The enforcement policies at issue
disclaimed having a legal force, at least as against the federal government. See, e.g., Memorandum from
John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field Office Dirs. et al. 6 (June 17, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [https://perma.
cc/WPZ8-EC94] (“[T]his memorandum . . . does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or
benefit . . . enforceable at law by any party . . . .”).
15
Indeed, Congress has granted immigration amnesty in the past, see Immigration Reform Control
Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), albeit to what was then a much smaller population
of undocumented immigrants.
16
See DAPA Memo, supra note 11; DACA Memo, supra note 11.
17
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
18
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–24, Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (No. 15-674); see also
infra Sections I.C, II.C (discussing the lawmaking relationship between Congress and Executive, in
immigration and more generally).
19
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 24.
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decision in Texas leaves open this important separation of powers
question.20
For decades, and continuing today, scholars and advocates have
addressed these types of constitutional questions by focusing on whether
immigration law warrants special treatment in regards to rights, or
federalism, or separation of powers—much like we have exposited above.21
At first blush, this disjunctive approach seems sensible. After all, rights,
separation of powers, and federalism are different.
This Article rejects that conventional approach, beginning with its
underlying premise. As we show, the Court’s exceptional immigration
doctrines are conceptually and pragmatically intertwined. Thus, answers to
any one of the examples above can influence answers to the others.
Building on that insight, this Article develops an alternative model of
immigration exceptionalism that arcs simultaneously across rights,
federalism, and separation of powers.
This theoretical intervention yields several analytic and pragmatic
payoffs. First, it provides a far more accurate rendering of how immigration
exceptionalism translates into practice. Doctrinally, the Court sometimes—
but not always—treats immigration exceptionally.22 Prescriptively, scholars
and advocates sometimes—but not always—want immigration treated that
way.23 In short, immigration exceptionalism has exceptions. Our model
allows that exceptionalism is not, and need not be, an all-or-nothing
proposition.24 Yet, once that is recognized, it becomes imperative to
understand how strands of exceptional and mainstream constitutional

20

See Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 2272. Subsequently, the United States filed a petition for rehearing,
Petition for Rehearing, id. (No. 15-674), which the Court denied. Petition for Rehearing Denied, Texas,
137 S. Ct. 285 (No. 15-674).
21
The academic literature on immigration exceptionalism is legion, featuring commentary from
nearly every prominent immigration law scholar, and others, over the past four decades. Cf. David A.
Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 30 (2015) (“It
almost seems an obligatory rite of passage for scholars embarking on the study of immigration law to
provide their own critique of plenary power or related doctrines of deference.”). For the scholarship on
rights exceptionalism, see infra Section II.A; on federalism, see infra Section II.B; and on separation of
powers, see infra Section II.C.
22
See infra Part I (canvassing the Court’s immigration jurisprudence).
23
See infra Part II (surveying academic treatments of immigration exceptionalism over time and
across constitutional contexts).
24
See Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1393 (1999) (“Immigration can be exceptional for some
purposes and not for others.”); cf. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 114–16, 121
(2015) [hereinafter MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION] (arguing that the exclusivity principle can apply
differently to subfederal restrictionist and integrationist laws).
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doctrines interface with each other, and with politics, in ways that impact
the immigration system as a whole.
Second, our model unmasks how seemingly discrete doctrines can
look very different in combination than how they appear in isolation.25 For
instance, a President might unilaterally craft federal integrationist polices
(courtesy of separation of powers exceptionalism). And those policies, in
turn, may preempt subfederal restrictionist policies as in Arizona (courtesy
of federalism exceptionalism).26 Still, this outcome is highly contingent. To
see how, mix in rights exceptionalism and change the President. Under this
alternative scenario, the new President could unilaterally act (again,
courtesy of separation of powers exceptionalism) in rights-depriving ways
(under rights exceptionalism) and may seek to have that policy preempt
subfederal integrationist policies, such as California’s (via federalism
exceptionalism).27
We return later to these and other crosscutting possibilities. For now,
these sketch examples are simply meant to illustrate why a coordinated
approach to immigration exceptionalism matters: these doctrines may
offset or aggregate, sometimes to very different ends, vis-à-vis immigrant
interests. Yet we cannot know until we expand the frame to look on a
system-wide basis, over time, and with sensitivity to political swings.

25

As recent studies in systems theory suggest, complex systems often behave in ways that are not
easily predictable. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION (2011) (bringing
systems theory to constitutional law).
26
In 2010, Arizona enacted S.B. 1070 to impose a policy of “attrition through enforcement,” which
overtly sought to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity
by persons unlawfully present in the United States.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497
(2012) (quoting Note following ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11–1051 (2012)). Section 3 imposed criminal
penalties on aliens who failed to comply with federal alien-registration requirements. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13–1509 (2016). Section 5(C) criminalized unauthorized aliens who sought or engaged in work
in the state. See id. § 13–2928(C). Section 6 authorized officers to arrest without a warrant a person “the
officer has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that makes the person
removable from the United States.” Id. § 13–3883(A)(5). Finally, Section 2(B) provided that officers
who conduct a stop, detention, or arrest must in some circumstances make efforts to verify the person’s
immigration status with the federal government. See id. § 11–1051(B). The Court invalidated Sections
3, 5(C), and 6 on preemption grounds but left section 2(B) intact. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. For
further discussion of the case, see infra notes 113–21 and accompanying text.
27
Cf. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, Op-Ed., Immigration Reform: ‘The California
Package,’ L.A. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0624ramakrishnan-state-citizenship-20150624-story.html [https://perma.cc/LY5U-AV9E] (explaining how
California has “encourage[ed] integration rather than deportation” through immigration policies);
“Sanctuary Cities,” Trust Acts, and Community Policing Explained, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Oct. 10,
2015), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/sanctuary-cities-trust-acts-and-community-policing
-explained [https://perma.cc/N9H8-UTYU] (describing federal sanctuary laws, which generally limit
local law enforcement from actively assisting in immigration enforcement).
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Third, with this reorientation, recent landmark cases like Texas and
Arizona take on more nuance and peril than conventional analyses
suggest.28 Both cases raise bundled constitutional questions, which contextspecific approaches have no way to register.29 By contrast, our model
contextualizes these cases, capturing the tensions and overlaps between
them. Moreover, our holistic approach provides new analytical ingress to
future cases, including those currently pending in the Court.30
With so much immigration policy up for grabs across all levels of
government,31 a reappraisal of immigration exceptionalism is necessary to
meet the mounting challenge. More broadly, this Article also contributes to
nascent studies of doctrinal cross-pollination in other areas of constitutional
and administrative law.32 Thus, while this Article’s central focus is
28

United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam) (affirming, without opinion,
the Fifth Circuit’s preliminary injunction of DAPA in Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th
Cir. 2015)); Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492.
29
Cf. Reply Brief for United States at 2, Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (No. 15-674) (characterizing the
case as one “that implicates fundamental questions of standing, separation of powers, federal
immigration authority, and administrative law”); Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy, 2012 SUP.
CT. REV. 31, 62–63 (“Arizona may be less significant for its impact on state immigration initiatives than
for ratifying and furthering the consolidation of immigration authority in the executive branch.”); David
S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81,
85–87 (2013) (situating Arizona at the intersection of separation of powers and federalism); infra
Section III.C.1 and accompanying notes (exposing additional overlaps between Arizona and Texas).
30
At least two constitutional immigration cases will be heard this upcoming term. See Rodriguez v.
Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016)
(due process challenges to the federal government’s immigration detention policies); Morales-Santana
v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016) (equal protection
challenge to immigration statute’s facial gender distinctions regarding parental conferral of derivative
citizenship to children).
31
See, e.g., Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act: Hearing
on S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013) (passed Senate but voted down in House); Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82
Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Exec.
Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK
RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM ch. 3 (2015) (surveying uptick in state and local
laws pertaining to noncitizens); John M. Glionna, Arizona Immigration: “Show Me Your Papers”
Enforcement to Begin, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/18/nation/lana-nn-arizona-immigration-20120918 [https://perma.cc/7772-UEXK]; Michael D. Shear, Obama,
Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/obama-immigration-speech.html
[https://perma.cc/726DBY8F].
32
The crossovers and intersections of rights, separation of powers, and federalism questions are as
old as the Constitution itself. The questions abounding today, however, are how these dimensions
interact, or should interact, to account for new dynamics in modern government. See, e.g., Cynthia R.
Farina & Gillian E. Metzger, Introduction: The Place of Agencies in Polarized Government,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1683, 1685–87 (2015) (summarizing a set of recent symposium contributions, all
of which hit on one or more of the intersections between rights, separation of powers, federalism, and
administrative law); David S. Rubenstein, Administrative Federalism as Separation of Powers,
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (2015) (recasting administrative federalism as proxy for separation of
powers). The Court, too, seems increasingly sensitive to these crossovers, but can generally approach
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immigration, its animating themes may usefully inform other fields of
public law.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I summarizes the Court’s
jurisprudence on immigration exceptionalism. We suggest that the contours
of this fractured canon are in flux. Some exceptional doctrines show signs
of receding, while others may be ascending.33
Part II charts the academic reactions to the Court’s immigration
exceptionalism jurisprudence across time and constitutional contexts. The
scope of our survey is the first of its kind. More importantly, this study
uncovers a set of advocacy patterns and trends that are central to our
project.
Foremost,
scholars
invariably
renounce
immigration
exceptionalism as it pertains to constitutional rights, but often defend or
promote special immigration doctrines for federalism and separation of
powers.34 This contrast suggests that context-specific arguments in favor or
against the Court’s immigration doctrines are a means to ends. For
example, scholars and advocates gesture to exceptionalism as added legal
cover for executive action that is favorable to immigrant interests. In other
instances, exceptionalism is invoked to tamp down restrictionist state
policies, or, more generally, to root out perceived injustices in the
immigration system.
Part III explains why immigration exceptionalism is a fraught means
to certain ends. More specifically, we highlight how the Court’s
immigration doctrines share a common set of rationales that reverberate
across constitutional dimensions. Accordingly, the reasons for giving
immigration exceptional (or normalized) treatment in any one doctrinal
setting can pull and push across other settings, in potentially crosscutting
and unintended ways. For example, if immigration is exceptional for
purposes of federalism (in ways that someone favors), then perhaps
immigration will continue to be exceptional for rights too (in ways that the
same person disfavors). Moreover, political shifts can upset expectations
about how mainstream and exceptional doctrines will translate in action.
Control of the White House, for instance, comes with levers that can shape

them only ad hoc. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2101 (2014) (explaining that “[t]he
distinction between provisions protecting individual liberty, on the one hand, and ‘structural’
provisions, on the other,” is not always helpful because “structure in general—and especially the
structure of limited federal powers—is designed to protect individual liberty”); United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692–93 (2013) (relying on a mix of federalism and rights theories to strike
down the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
33
See infra Part I.
34
Of course, there is some important nuance to this claim, which we develop in Part II.
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immigration policy not only at the federal level, but at the subfederal level
too.35
Part IV then hypothesizes a range of normative tradeoffs that inhere in
this dynamic regime of law and politics. We frame the discussion around a
stylized “trilemma”—a dilemma with three horns.36 More specifically, we
illustrate how arguments for or against special immigration doctrines for
rights, federalism, and separation of powers will almost certainly require
normative compromises within or across constitutional dimensions. Under
most immigration scholars’ and advocates’ ideal preference, immigration
law would be exceptional for some purposes (e.g., for federalism and
perhaps for separation of powers), while simultaneously normalized for
rights adjudication. This preferred end-state, however, is fundamentally
unstable, and most likely out of reach under existing precedent. Thus, we
argue, strategic prioritization among competing values and second-best
assessments are necessary.
Part V offers some specific thoughts for how theorists, advocates, and
jurists might put this Article’s insights to use. For scholars and immigrant
advocates, this Article presents a new set of considerations about whether
and how to ring the exceptionalism bell.37 For jurists, the takeaway may be
different but links to the same lessons. Foremost, doctrines and cases can
look different in combination than they do in isolation.38 The way forward
is anything but sure. Regardless of ideological orientation, however, this
Article’s holistic approach to immigration exceptionalism offers a new
foundation on which to build.

35

See Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The President & Immigration
Federalism, 68 FLA. L. REV. 101 (2016) (discussing the myriad ways Presidents can influence statelevel policy on immigration).
36
The term has been used before in other settings. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of
N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (explaining that the rationale of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination is to free criminal defendants of the “cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt”). Here, we employ the term to capture a set of normative tradeoffs across the
constitutional dimensions on rights, federalism, and separation of powers.
37
Government lawyers may also appreciate and draw from this Article’s offerings. But government
lawyers are not our primary audience here, for reasons that dovetail with our broader claims. The
government can always argue for exceptionalism in court, yet mitigate its effects politically or
administratively when it so chooses. For instance, the federal government can choose to pass more
rights-regarding laws, acquiesce to state and local policies, afford procedural protections beyond what
the Administrative Procedure Act requires, and so forth. By contrast, immigrant advocates and theorists
do not have those luxuries; they can argue for or against exceptionalism but have little control over the
government’s uses (and abuses) of the resulting power arrangements.
38
To be clear, we do not suggest that courts can or should decide more than what is before them.
With this Article’s insights, however, jurists can make more informed decisions about the actual scope
and real-world implications of the cases they decide.
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I.

DESCRIPTIVE EXCEPTIONALISM

The story of how immigration law became and stayed exceptional is
foundational to our nation’s history.39 This Part recalls some of that story,
and provides context for Part II’s novel spinoff: namely, how academic
reactions to immigration exceptionalism have varied across time and
doctrinal contexts. To mark those contrasts, here we chart the Court’s
immigration jurisprudence. Section I.A offers a descriptive account of the
Court’s rights jurisprudence. We then turn to structure, offering descriptive
accounts of immigration federalism in Section I.B, and separation of
powers in Section I.C.
Before proceeding, we offer two refining caveats. First, the very idea
of exceptionalism is relativistic inasmuch as it connotes departures from
mainstream legal norms. Some might reasonably quibble with
characterizing immigration as exceptional writ large, given that other
domains—such as foreign affairs and Indian law—also famously depart
from the mainstream.40 Still, this Article abides to the widely held view that
special legal norms often apply in immigration.41 As one prominent
commentator described immigration law more than thirty years ago, in
ways that still register today: “Probably no other area of American law has
been so radically insulated and divergent from those fundamental norms of
constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that animate
the rest of our legal system.”42
Second, some commentators might characterize a particular
immigration doctrine as exceptional, whereas others may not. That is,
reasonable minds may differ on immigration exceptionalism writ small. We

39

See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN
(tracing that history); see also Schuck, supra note 1.
40
See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002)
(linking these domains); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1913, 1928–29 (2015) (situating immigration exceptionalism within the
foreign relations exceptionalism tent). We should note that while there is overlap between these
exceptional domains, there are also major differences among them. Immigration may have a foot in
foreign relations law, but the other foot is firmly planted in domestic law.
41
See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 564–65 (1990) (treating
immigration law as exceptional); see also Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 40, at 1924–34 (describing
foreign relations law as exceptional, some of the time, and arguing for across-the-board normalization
in this domain). The alternative is to abandon the idea of constitutional and subconstitutional
mainstreams—an intriguing possibility worth pursuing, but one that we bracket here. Cf. Daniel
Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration
Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 714–15 & n.48 (1997) (questioning the idea of “mainstream public law,”
and thus hedging on the idea of immigration exceptionalism).
42
See Schuck, supra note 1, at 1.
AND AMERICA 177–222 (1987)

593

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

flag these possibilities throughout,43 but they are mostly inconsequential to
our project. Here, we are foremost concerned with how courts and
commentators have conjured immigration’s distinct features as reasons for
specialized legal treatment.44 The exceptionalism label is useful shorthand.
But whether a particular doctrine is exceptional, as a formal matter, is less
important for our purposes than the functional tensions and overlaps that
emerge across doctrinal settings.
A.

Rights

President Trump’s temporary ban on refugees and immigrants from
several Muslim-majority countries sent political shock waves through the
American psyche and rippled across the globe.45 Perhaps more shocking, to
some, is that his immigration ban might be constitutional.46 In nonimmigration contexts, Congress’s complete (i.e., plenary) authority over a
subject is generally tested for compliance with structural limitations,47 and
subject to judicial scrutiny when constitutional rights are implicated.48 In
stark contrast, judicial review of federal immigration law under the
“plenary power doctrine” is extremely lax and forgiving.49 Thus,

43

See infra notes 106–09, 197–207 and accompanying text.
However, for a recent account that the Court is trending toward normalization, see Kevin R.
Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Unexceptionalism,
68 OKLA. L. REV. 57 (2015). This claim is contestable, however. See supra Part I (discussing how
recent cases have reified old forms of exceptionalism and shown signs on new forms emerging).
45
See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text; see also Aaron Blake, Trump’s Travel Ban Is
Causing Chaos—And Putting His Unflinching Nationalism to the Test, WASH. POST. (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/president-trumps-travel-ban-is-causingchaos-dont-expect-him-to-back-down/?utmterm=.d195c9324944 [https://perma.cc/GSV9-B63K]. In his
electoral run, then-candidate Trump’s suggestion to ban Muslims from the country received a similar
ovation. See, e.g., Russell Berman, Donald Trump’s Call to Ban Muslim Immigrants, ATLANTIC (Dec.
7,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/donald-trumps-call-to-ban-muslimimmigrants/419298/ [https://perma.cc/3WBL-YYHS]; Pema Levy, Trump Soars to New Heights in Poll
After Proposing Muslim Ban, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/
2015/12/donald-trump-proposes-ban-muslims-soars-new-heights-poll [https://perma.cc/L8LC-SLM3].
46
For competing views, see supra note 8.
47
See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2609 (2012) (reviewing and striking down
Affordable Care Act provisions as invalid exercises of congressional Spending and Commerce Clause
authority, despite recognizing Congress’s “plenary” authority over interstate commerce) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (applying the “undue burden” standard used to
assess due process challenges in abortion context to uphold federal abortion restrictions); Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (remanding and instructing lower court to apply strict
scrutiny in determining constitutionality of a federal law that required contract provision that gave
preference to disadvantaged individuals from certain racial and ethnic groups).
49
See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“Our cases have long recognized the power to
expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political
departments largely immune from judicial control.” (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
44

594

111:583 (2017)

Immigration Exceptionalism

substantive constitutional rights—such as equal protection, due process,
freedom of association, and so on—tend to garner less judicial scrutiny in
immigration cases than other areas of federal regulation.50
The plenary power doctrine in rights cases debuted in the late
nineteenth century, shortly after the federal government began regulating
immigration.51 In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the Court upheld the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 on the grounds that the federal government
had plenary authority to exclude immigrants on any basis, including race or
nationality.52 Soon after, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court
extended this reasoning to uphold a federal statute that made Chinese
laborers presumptively deportable.53 Because of Congress’s plenary
authority over immigration, the lack of due process afforded to the
petitioners was constitutionally irrelevant.54
In these Chinese Exclusion Cases, the Court’s putative rationales for
the plenary power doctrine ranged from institutional (e.g., the relative
competencies of the Court vis-à-vis the political branches in foreign
affairs), to extraconstitutional (e.g., international norms of sovereignty), to
pragmatic (e.g., national security).55 Whatever the underlying rationale, the
end result was a doctrine of broad judicial deference that, in many

(1953) (internal quotation marks omitted))); see also Motomura, supra note 41, at 547; Legomsky,
supra note 1, at 179 (coining the term “plenary power doctrine”).
50
See, e.g., Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792–94, 798–99 (upholding discriminatory law that excluded outof-wedlock children from claiming their biological fathers—but not mothers—as “parents” for
immigration benefits); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (reifying
Congress’s virtually impenetrable discretion, stating that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”).
51
See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–80 (1993) (explaining that in the first one hundred years of the
republic, the federal government played only a very minor role relative to states in regulating
immigration).
52
130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889).
53
149 U.S. 698 (1893). Chinese immigrants were required to obtain a certificate to prove their
residency and rebut the presumption of deportability, but by regulation, such certificate would only be
issued on the testimony of a “white witness.” Id. at 729.
54
Id. at 728 (opining on the breadth of congressional power to deport, noting “Congress, under the
power to exclude or expel aliens, might have directed any Chinese laborer, found in the United States
without a certificate of residence, to be removed out of the country by executive officers, without
judicial trial or examination, just as it might have authorized such officers absolutely to prevent his
entrance into the country”).
55
See Chae, 130 U.S. at 602–03 (stating that the Court is not a “censor of the morals of other
departments of the government”); id. at 603 (“Jurisdiction over its own territory to [exclude aliens] is an
incident of every independent nation.”); id. at 606 (providing wide berth for the legislature to protect
national security and make determinations that allowing in foreigners might endanger peace and
security); see also Legomsky, supra note 1 (parsing and critiquing the Court’s expressed justifications
for the plenary power doctrine).
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situations, foreclosed noncitizens from rights guaranteed to other persons
under the Constitution.
Of course, when these foundational immigration cases were decided,
the Court’s rights jurisprudence was undeveloped.56 As that jurisprudence
evolved over time, however, immigration law lagged behind. Still today,
the federal government’s immigration laws contain explicit gender
distinctions, ideological bars, associational restrictions, and per-country
limitations that inure to the detriment of specific nationalities.57 In addition,
the plenary power doctrine relaxes procedural protections for noncitizens in
admission and removal proceedings,58 and condones the extended detention
of potential deportees.59 More generally, the plenary power doctrine results
in a regulatory regime that, in the Court’s own words, “would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.”60
To be sure, some fissures in the Court’s plenary power doctrine
complicate this narrative.61 Occasionally, the Court has found deportation
or exclusion processes to be overly punitive or lacking sufficient
safeguards.62 In other instances, the Court has spoken the language of
mainstream constitutional standards, but has arguably applied those

56

See Motomura, supra note 41, at 551.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2012) (gender distinction in ability to transfer citizenship to children
born out of wedlock); id. § 1152 (numerical limitations on individual foreign states); id.
§ 1182(a)(3)(D) (exclusion for membership in totalitarian party); id. § 1182(a)(4) (exclusion on public
charge grounds). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S.
Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 15–22 (2009) (explaining racial
dimensions of immigration law).
58
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”).
59
See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 530–31 (2003) (upholding lengthy mandatory
detention); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215–16 (1953) (upholding government detention of
noncitizen on Ellis Island).
60
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). Rachel Rosenbloom draws critical attention to how
immigration exceptionalism also implicates the rights of citizens who get snared in immigration
enforcement, but have difficulty establishing citizenship owing to lax administrative procedures and
judicial review under the plenary power doctrine. See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line:
Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965 (2013).
61
See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (opining that even the significant
deference to federal immigration power does not authorize indefinite detention without review of
noncitizens whom no country will accept); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 36–37 (1982) (holding
that a returning legal permanent resident was entitled to more process than provided by the
government); see also Legomsky, supra note 1 (discussing inroads into the plenary power doctrine over
time); Motomura, supra note 41 (same).
62
See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903) (suggesting that some procedural
guarantees applied in deportation proceedings); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38
(1896) (holding that the Constitution prevented deportees from being subjected to hard labor prior to
deportation).
57
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standards differently. Nguyen v. INS is an example of this phenomenon.63
There, the Court upheld provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) that treat unwed fathers differently than unwed mothers for purposes
of conferring citizenship to their biological children. Because the Court
ruled that the INA provision survived mainstream gender discrimination
scrutiny, it had no need to rely on the exceptional plenary power doctrine
and expressly declined to do so.64 Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen,
however, accused the majority of “recit[ing]” the mainstream substantive
standard for heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications, “but
depart[ing] from the guidance . . . in several ways.”65 Thus, Nguyen might
be read either as a move towards normalization, or, alternatively, as a case
that uses a mainstream façade to mask an exceptional analysis and result.
Even granting these nuances, rights challenges to the federal political
branches’ immigration decisions generally swim upstream against the
plenary power doctrine and its vestiges.66 Indeed, two terms ago, the
Court’s plurality decision in Kerry v. Din rejected a U.S. citizen’s due
process claim that the State Department improperly denied her spouse a
visa on terrorism-related grounds.67 The plurality was unmoved by Din’s
asserted liberty interest in family unification, stating: “This Court has
consistently recognized that these various distinctions are policy questions
entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and we
have no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the
Congress.”68
63

533 U.S. 53 (2001).
Id. at 72–73 (“[W]e need not assess the implications of statements in our earlier cases regarding
the wide deference afforded to Congress in the exercise of its immigration and naturalization power.”).
65
Id. at 78 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
66
See Michael Kagan, Plenary Power Is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power, 114 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 26–28 (2015); Martin, supra note 21 (providing an account for why the plenary
power doctrine endures); see also infra Section II.A (discussing academic critiques of Court’s
immigration rights jurisprudence and frustrations over the stickiness of the plenary power doctrine).
67
135 S. Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015) (plurality opinion); see also Kevin Johnson, Argument Preview:
The Doctrine of Consular Non-Reviewability—Historical Relic or Good Law?, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18,
2015, 9:55 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/argument-preview-the-doctrine-of-consular-nonreviewability-historicalrelic-or-good-law/ [https://perma.cc/6C32-2SCM] (describing the doctrine of
consular non-reviewability, at issue in Din, as the “first cousin of immigration law’s exceptional
‘plenary power’ doctrine”).
68
Din, 135 U.S. at 2136 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Two additional Justices concurred only in judgment, writing that even assuming Din
had a due process interest, plaintiff received the process she was due. Id. at 2141 (Kennedy & Alito, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[R]espect for the political branches’ broad power over the creation and
administration of the immigration system extends to determinations of how much information the
Government is obliged to disclose about a consular officer’s denial of a visa to an alien abroad.”). The
four dissenting Justices argued that Din both had a due process interest, and that the process she
received was insufficient. Id. at 2142–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, JJ.).
64
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The foregoing account describes the Court’s general approach when
federal regulations are challenged on constitutional rights grounds. But the
Court’s general treatment of similar challenges to state and local
regulations is governed by a different set of doctrines.69 For example, the
Court generally applies strict scrutiny to state laws that discriminate on the
basis of alienage or nationality, at least when challenged by lawful
permanent residents.70
The Court’s incongruent treatment of rights challenges to federal and
subfederal regulations was drawn into sharp relief in a famous pair of cases
decided in the 1970s. In Graham v. Richardson, the Court reviewed
challenges to the legality of a state law that denied public assistance to
some legal resident noncitizens.71 The Court declared—for the first time—
that alienage is a suspect classification.72 Thus, the Court applied the
requirements of strict scrutiny and struck down the state law on equal
protection grounds.73
A few years after Graham, however, the Supreme Court clarified in
Mathews v. Diaz that the federal government was not bound by the same
limitation.74 More specifically, the Diaz Court invoked the plenary power
doctrine and upheld federal alienage distinctions for receiving certain
benefits.75 Distinguishing Graham, the Court explained that the “Fourteenth
Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially different from the
constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration
and naturalization.”76
The incongruence in the Court’s immigration rights jurisprudence is,
itself, an anomaly in the law. Indeed, in non-immigration contexts, the
69

See Linda Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1047, 1104–05 (1994) (discussing the incongruity); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 838 (2008) (same); see also Brian
Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 158–59 (2014).
70
See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to state law
discriminating on account of alienage). The level of judicial scrutiny applicable to state laws that
discriminate against undocumented immigrants is less certain. In Plyler v. Doe, the Court noted that
aliens’ unlawful status was constitutionally relevant, and that undocumented immigrants as a class were
generally not protected under heightened judicial scrutiny. 457 U.S. 202, 235–36 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 219 n.19 (majority opinion) (explicitly rejecting the notion that “illegal
aliens” are a “suspect class”). Plyler’s reasoning, however, has not been extended beyond application to
undocumented children in primary or secondary school.
71
403 U.S. at 366.
72
Id. at 371–72.
73
Id. at 376. According to the Court, a state’s fiscal interests and “desire to preserve limited
welfare benefits for its own citizens” did not justify this invidious distinction between residents. Id. at
374.
74
426 U.S. 67 (1976).
75
Id. at 85.
76
Id. at 86–87.
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Court has stressed the need for congruity in how equal protection
challenges are handled under the Fifth Amendment (for the federal
government) and Fourteenth Amendment (for the states).77
The issue of rights exceptionalism will surely continue to occupy the
federal courts’ agenda. Indeed, as this Article goes to print, the Supreme
Court is deliberating on two cases that squarely pit immigration
exceptionalism against constitutional rights.78 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the
Court will decide whether due process requires that certain immigration
detainees be afforded bond hearings when detained for prolonged periods.79
And, in Lynch v. Morales-Santana, the Court will decide whether statutory
gender distinctions regarding parental transfers of citizenship to children
satisfy equal protection requirements.80 In both cases, looming questions of
immigration exceptionalism may be decisive.81
In addition, jurisprudence on the incongruous treatment of state versus
federal alienage classifications continues to develop in lower federal and
state courts. Notably, these emerging cases may be smoothing out the
differences between judicial approaches to federal and state immigrationrelated restrictions. However, it is not clear in which direction this
incongruity will break. One recent study suggests that lower federal courts
may be trending toward giving subfederal laws more deference, with
reasoning that seems to channel plenary power analysis.82
77

See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215–18, 226–27 (1995) (holding “that all
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)
(“[T]he Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would
be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”).
78
See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, Jennings v. Rodriguez,
136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (due process and statutory challenges to the federal government’s immigration
detention policies); Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct.
2545 (2016) (equal protection challenge to immigration statute’s facial gender distinctions regarding
parental conferral of derivative citizenship to children).
79
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (No. 15-1204).
80
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Morales-Santana, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (No. 15-1191).
81
In a recent article, Michael Kagan also discusses immigration laws looming problems with the
Fourth Amendment. See Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem,
104 GEO. L.J. 125 (2015).
82
See generally Jenny-Brooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants?,
73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 129–150 (2016) (citing and discussing Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d
1242 (10th Cir. 2004); Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014); Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572 (9th
Cir. 2014); Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2011); Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional
Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 2002)). Professor Condon argues that these cases “reflect a
congressional imprimatur theory of state alienage discrimination.” Id. at 133. Moreover, she argues that
these decisions “turning back equal protection challenges to states’ unequal allocation of state resources
to legal residents and citizens illustrate courts’ tendency to view such issues with a formalism that
insufficiently probes state responsibility for immigrants’ unequal treatment, and instead
disproportionately credits congressional immigration prerogatives . . . .” Id. at 138.
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B.

Federalism

For the nation’s first hundred years, the federal government hardly
regulated immigration.83 Instead, states and local jurisdictions did.84 Later,
in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, the Court interpreted the Constitution
to vest immigration power solely in the federal government. And, as a
consequence, the Court struck down several subfederal immigration laws
of that era.85
Until recently, the Court’s general hostility to state and local
immigration measures quieted most subfederal attempts to regulate
immigrants.86 The past decade, however, has witnessed an unprecedented
surge in state and local immigration initiatives.87 The reasons behind this
trend are a matter of some debate, but partisan polarization and political
opportunism are perhaps the primary drivers.88 Viewed broadly, the
“subfederal immigration revolution” captures a range of political
preferences for our ailing immigration system, especially as Congress
effectively remains sidelined.89

83

See Neuman, supra note 51, at 1841–80.
See id. (explaining how states regulated migration through ports-of-entry taxes and restrictions
on the movement of paupers, criminals, and those posing health risks); GULASEKARAM &
RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 31, ch. 3 (chronicling state and local restrictionist laws from 1876 through
the present day).
85
Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 273–75 (1875) (striking down requirement of a bond
to be posted by shipmasters for arriving alien passengers); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276,
280–81 (1875) (striking down state regulation that imposed a bond for arriving alien passengers deemed
to be “lewd and debauched”); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 572–73 (1849) (striking
down state laws that imposed taxes on arriving alien ship passengers).
86
See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (holding that state denial of student financial aid
to certain visa holders was preempted); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–80 (1971) (striking
down state welfare laws that discriminated against legal permanent residents); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (striking down state alienage restriction on commercial
fishing licenses); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (striking down state alien registration
scheme); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (striking down state law prohibiting hiring of noncitizens);
cf. Huntington, supra note 69, at 822–23 (noting that “states and localities have not enacted pure
immigration laws since the end of the nineteenth century”).
87
See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 31, at 5–8, 57–59; MOTOMURA, supra note
24, at 58–59, 80–81; State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-laws-related-toimmigration-and-immigrants.aspx [https://perma.cc/44XM-4KJZ] (tracking a steady rise in state
immigration-related laws and resolutions over the past decade).
88
GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 31, at ch. 4.
89
Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 81–82 (explaining that “[a]t the heart of the ‘subfederal
immigration revolution’ are two core questions”: first, “what to do about our ‘broken’ immigration
system,” and second, “which institution of government, relative to others, has the power to do what”
(footnotes omitted)).
84
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As noted earlier, subfederal immigration policies fill a spectrum from
restrictionist to integrationist measures.90 In short, the idea behind most
restrictionist measures is to encourage undocumented immigrants to “selfdeport.”91 Examples of restrictionist laws include those that give subfederal
officials a role in detection, arrest, and detention of noncitizens on the basis
of federal immigration violations. Restrictionist laws also make it difficult
or impossible for undocumented immigrants to rent housing, find work, or
attend public schools.92 Arizona’s harsh immigration policies, some of
which were at issue in Arizona v. United States, are just the tip of the
iceberg.93 A patchwork of restrictionist subfederal law persists throughout
the country.94
By contrast, state and local integrationist measures offer a sense of
belonging and welcoming to immigrants. Examples of integrationist laws
include so-called sanctuary laws, which limit the discretion of subfederal
officers to identify and detain individuals suspected of unlawful presence.95
Other types of integrationist laws provide public benefits to undocumented
immigrants, such as in-state college tuition, municipal identification cards,
or access to healthcare benefits.96 New York even considered extending
90

See, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013)
(discussing a range of subfederal immigration-related measures).
91
See, e.g., S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010) (declaring the purpose of the Act
to be “attrition through enforcement”); see also Kris Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States
Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 472 (2008) (promoting
restrictionist state and local laws as a means to self-deportation). Incidentally, self-deportation, in
general, is not something that the federal government disapproves of. See Kevin R. Johnson,
Government Ads Nudge Immigrants to Self-Deport, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Aug. 13, 2008), http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2008/08/government-ads.html [https://perma.cc/MS5C-SEJZ].
92
See MOTOMURA, supra note 24, at 58–59, 80–81.
93
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 contained several provisions, but four were at issue in the Supreme Court
case. See supra note 26 (providing a capsule summary of the provisions at issue in the Arizona
litigation). The Court invalidated three of the four provisions, leaving only Section 2(B) in force.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). Litigation on the discriminatory potential of
Section 2(B) continued in a separate suit, which was recently settled by the plaintiffs and Attorney
General of Arizona, rendering the provision unenforceable. Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061PHX-SRB, 2012 WL 8021265, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 5, 2012).
94
See State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, supra note 87 (tracking state and local
immigration initiatives).
95
See Barbara E. Armacost, ‘Sanctuary’ Laws: The New Immigration Federalism (Virginia Pub.
Law and Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 2016-45), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2823925 [https://perma.cc/D24H-3PMQ]; “Sanctuary Cities,” Trust Acts, and Community
Policing Explained, supra note 27 (describing federal sanctuary laws, which generally limit local law
enforcement from actively assisting in immigration enforcement); see also Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant
Protective Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245 (2016) (providing a descriptive and
empirical account of recent subfederal law enforcement policies).
96
See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 31, at 5–8, 57–67, 127–41 (chronicling and
describing the range of integrationist subfederal laws); Ramakrishnan & Colbern, supra note 27
(describing “the California package” of immigrant-friendly laws).
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“state citizenship” to undocumented immigrants, along with a portfolio of
associated benefits.97 This integrationist trend encompasses lawfully
present noncitizens as well, with some measures aimed at allowing them to
vote in certain types of local elections.98
In exceptionalism’s shadow, questions proliferate over whether these
subfederal initiatives can survive, and if so, which ones and why not others.
The uncertainty is mostly of the Court’s own making. Its immigration–
federalism jurisprudence consists of a mash of preemption- and rightsbased rationales, which are partly exceptional and partly not.99
Most notably, the Court applies mainstream statutory preemption
doctrines to test subfederal immigration laws. Under the Court’s statutory
preemption taxonomy, Congress can expressly or impliedly preempt
subfederal laws.100 For implied preemption, Congress’s intent can be
inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject” (i.e., field preemption).101
Moreover, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law,
including when they stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”102 Applying this
familiar framework, for example, the Court recently considered whether
congressional statutes expressly or impliedly preempted Arizona’s laws

97

See Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 869 (2015) (explaining and defending the legality of the proposed state citizenship bill).
Ultimately, the bill did not pass, although the idea behind it and its provisions remain poignant and
revivable in New York and elsewhere.
98
Kanishk Tharoor, Non-Citizens in New York City Could Soon Be Given Right to Vote,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/02/new-york-city-noncitizens-local-elections [https://perma.cc/TL2R-WTPK]; Pamela Constable, D.C., Other Cities Debate
Whether Legal Immigrants Should Have Voting Rights, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/should-legal-immigrants-have-voting-rightscontentious-issue-comesto-dc-other-cities/2015/02/09/85072440-ab0f-11e4-ad71-7b9eba0f87d6_story.html [https://perma.cc/
T74G-FDJM].
99
See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–78 (1971) (striking down alienage
distinctions in state welfare laws on both preemption and equal protection grounds); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33, 39, 41–42 (1915) (striking down state law limiting employment of noncitizens as a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also insisting that that the authority to control immigration
is vested solely with the federal government); see also GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note
31, at 187 (“[K]ey foundational immigration federalism cases have consistently evinced an implicit
meshing of both federalism and equal protection doctrine.”).
100
See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
101
See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted).
102
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (footnote omitted).
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that regulated employment of undocumented immigrants, with mixed
results.103
Beyond the mainstream, immigration federalism jurisprudence is
inflected with at least two (maybe three) exceptional features. Namely: (1)
the federal exclusivity principle, (2) preemption via nonbinding executive
enforcement policies; and, less clearly, (3) incorporating equality norms
into preemption analysis.
1. The Exclusivity Principle.—The federal government has exclusive
control over the “regulation of immigration.”104 Any state attempts to
regulate in this sphere are per se invalid under this standard.105 The
exclusivity doctrine’s scope, however, depends on what qualifies as
immigration regulation.
In De Canes v. Bica, the Court provided some guidance, explaining
that immigration regulation pertains only to the admission and expulsion of
noncitizens.106 So construed, the exclusivity principle has little or no
bearing on state and local “alienage” regulations, which are defined
residually as policies that pertain to immigrants but that do not govern their
admission or expulsion.107
The line between immigration regulation and alienage regulation can
be hard to discern in practice.108 Functionally speaking, many laws that
pertain to immigrants—both at the federal and subfederal level—may
impact migration decisions, indirectly even if not directly. For present
purposes, however, what matters is that the exclusivity principle
automatically preempts subfederal laws that qualify as immigration
regulation (whereas subfederal alienage regulations may still be displaced
by other preemption doctrines but not under the exclusivity doctrine).109

103

See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (applying mainstream preemption
doctrines and striking down sanctions directed at unlawful workers); Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 588, 593–611 (2010) (applying mainstream preemption doctrines and upholding
state licensing sanctions directed at employers that knowingly hired unauthorized workers).
104
See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353–54 (1976).
105
See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (holding that state denial of student financial
aid to certain visa holders was preempted).
106
See 424 U.S. at 355.
107
See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of
Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 259–61, 263–64, 269 (2011) (defining
“alienage law” in opposition to “immigration law”).
108
See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 351–53
(2008) (arguing that the distinction between immigration law and alienage law is misguided).
109
For instance, alienage regulations may still be preempted by federal statutes under the Court’s
mainstream preemption doctrine or by executive action. See infra Section I.B.2. See generally Arizona
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (preempting three Arizona state laws on these grounds).
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Unlike the Court’s statutory preemption doctrine, preemption via the
exclusivity principle is pegged to the Constitution itself (or, more precisely,
to the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution’s structural allocations of
power).110 Although there is room for disagreement, we think it is fair to
characterize the exclusivity principle as an exceptional relic of “dual
federalism,” under which federal or state power over a subject is regarded
as mutually exclusive.111 However, dual federalism has long been regarded
as dead in almost all other contexts.112 Instead, garden-variety domestic law
is characterized today by federal–state regulatory overlap, of both
“cooperative” and “uncooperative” varieties.113
To be sure, federal statutes and regulations (as opposed to the
Constitution itself) sometimes displace all state or local law in a particular
field.114 In the Court’s own words, Congress’s intent is the “ultimate

110

See Huntington, supra note 69, at 821–24 (discussing the genesis of the notion of “exclusive”
federal authority over immigration).
111
See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1950)
(describing this federalist conception).
112
See generally id. (providing the classic account of this conceptual and doctrinal transformation).
Even as an expression of dual federalism, the exclusivity principle as it operates in immigration law is a
special type: the federal government “devolves” its exclusive immigration power to states. For example,
Congress expressly permits states to treat classes of immigrants differently as pertains to federal welfare
benefits, see Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, §§ 400–451, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260–77, and expressly allows a role for subfederal actors to
enforce federal immigration regulations, see 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012). The government’s official
position on immigration enforcement is that it is both devolvable to subfederal actors, and, moreover,
that unless preempted, states have some inherent authority to enforce at least certain aspects of
immigration law. See Non-Preemption of the Auth. of State & Local Law Enforcement Officials to
Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations, 26 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2002). That devolution would not be
possible under traditional conceptions of dual federalism. Cf. Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the
Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the
Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 987 (2004) (“[T]he immigration power is an exclusively
federal power that must be exercised uniformly.”); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 500
(2001) (arguing that “Congress’s 1996 effort to devolve its federal immigration power is
constitutionally impermissible”).
113
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1258–84 (2009); ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009) (explaining that regulatory overlap is common and discussing the
values of it); see also Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional
and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2098 (2014) (observing that the Court’s immigration
federalism looks quite different from its economic federalism); Cox, supra note 29, at 37–41
(explaining how the Arizona Court’s conception of immigration enforcement contrasts with other
enforcement contexts).
114
See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“The scheme of federal
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it.”).
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touchstone” in every preemption case.115 But this type of statutory field
preemption is rare.116 More to the point, the exclusivity principle operates to
preempt state law irrespective of congressional intent, and for that reason
alone is different than statutory field preemption.
The exclusivity principle seems to have less traction in the Supreme
Court than it once did (although lower court judges still invoke the doctrine
rather liberally).117 In Arizona, for example, the Supreme Court treated the
state’s restrictionist laws as alienage regulations, despite Arizona’s
announced purpose to encourage undocumented immigrants to selfdeport.118 Likewise, in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, the Court upheld
two other state immigration-related provisions without gesturing to the
exclusivity principle.119 In both Arizona and Whiting, the Court arguably
could have characterized and treated the state laws as immigration
regulation. If nothing else, the Court’s treatment of these state laws as
alienage regulations suggest that the zone of federal exclusivity—over the

115

See, e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008); Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local
1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
116
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (“[E]ven where a federal statute does
displace state authority, it rarely occupies a legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by
the legal systems of the states . . . . Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on
an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited objectives.” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
117
Cf. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (“In preemption analysis, courts
should assume that ‘the historic police powers of the States’ are not superseded ‘unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230)). Recent lower court
treatments have relied to greater and lesser extents on the exclusivity principle. See, e.g., Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 546 (5th Cir. 2013) (Dennis, J., specially
concurring) (arguing that city’s policy penalizing landlords for renting property to unauthorized
immigrants “violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the [f]ederal
[g]overnment” (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506)); id. at 543 (Reavley, J., concurring in judgment)
(“Because the sole purpose and effect of this ordinance is to target the presence of illegal aliens . . . and
to cause their removal, it contravenes the federal government’s exclusive authority on the regulation of
immigration . . . .”); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1294–96 (11th Cir. 2012) (characterizing
Alabama’s law that invalidated contracts entered into by unauthorized immigrants as “a calculated
policy of expulsion” and “a thinly veiled attempt to regulate immigration,” and therefore striking down
the law because the power to expel immigrants “is retained only by the federal government”); Lozano v.
Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the city ordinance at issue was designed to
effectively remove undocumented immigrants from the political subdivision); cf. Ariz. Dream Act Coal.
v. Brewer, 818 F.3d 901, 917 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that Arizona’s classifications of undocumented
immigrants was preempted, but sending mixed signals on whether preemption was attributable to the
exclusivity principle or the Immigration and Nationality Act’s field-preemption).
118
See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (“The legislature declares that the intent of
this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of [the] state . . . . [T]his act [is]
intended . . . to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens . . . .”); Arizona, 132 S.
Ct. at 2497 (explicitly noting this state intent).
119
563 U.S. 582, 587, 594–607 (2011) (applying ordinary statutory preemption principles to state
law penalizing employment of unauthorized workers).
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admission and expulsion of noncitizens—will be tightly construed by the
Court in future cases.
2. Executive Preemption via Nonbinding Policy.—Yet, just as the
Court seems to be cabining the exclusivity principle, it may be embracing a
new form of federalism exceptionalism. More specifically, the Arizona
majority strongly implied (if not held) that executive branch enforcement
policies had independent preemptive effect.120 As earlier explained, a valid
congressional statute clearly has preemptive effect.121 Furthermore, the
Court has long held that federal agency action with the “force of law” can
have preemptive effect.122 Thus, for example, agency regulations
promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures can

120

See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (finding one of the state laws preempted on the partial ground
that state law “could be exercised without any input from [the Executive] about whether an arrest is
warranted in a particular case,” thus “allow[ing] the State to achieve its own immigration policy”); see
also David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
267, 280–81 (2015) (explaining the ways in which the Court’s signals were mixed on the issue of
whether executive enforcement policies can, or did, have preemptive effect); Eric Posner, The Imperial
President of Arizona, SLATE (June 26, 2012, 12:04 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/06/the_supreme_court_s_arizona_immigration_ruling_and_the_
imperial_presidency_.html [https://perma.cc/93RJ-W8US] (observing that the Arizona majority found
certain provisions of S.B. 1070 preempted, not because they conflicted with federal law, but because
they “conflict[ed] with the president’s policy”).
121
See, e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (“‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996)); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 9–20 (1824) (priming preemption decision
with an exploration of whether the federal law at issue was valid under the Commerce Clause in the
first place).
122
See supra note 13. In general, the term “force of law” connotes an agency policy or action that
is binding on the public or agency. Whether a particular agency action has the force of law—and its
implications—can depend on context. Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things
Americans Can’t Figure Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 23 (2009)
(describing the “force of law” as “one of the more pernicious phrases in American administrative law”);
see also Kristen E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 467 (2013)
(exploring the “old perennial” question: “what does it mean for agency action to carry the ‘force of
law’?”). The confusion is partly of the Court’s own making. It employs the term in at least three
administrative law contexts: (1) administrative preemption, (2) judicial deference to agency action, and
(3) exemptions from notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
For discussions of these alternative uses of force of law, see Rubenstein, supra note 120, at 278–79
(discussing force of law in the context of administrative preemption); Hickman, supra, at 472–90
(discussing force of law in the context of the Court’s Chevron doctrines and APA rulemaking
exceptions). As a general matter, agency adjudications and legislative rules have the force of law,
whereas other agency action—such as “general statements of policies” expressed in agency
memoranda, manuals, regulatory preambles, and amicus briefs—do not have the force of law. See
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 580 (2009) (holding that preamble to regulation, which was not
binding, could not have preemptive effect); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)
(stating that, for the purposes of applying the Chevron deference doctrine, agency opinion letters,
interpretations in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines do not have the force
of law).
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preempt conflicting state law.123 Arguably, however, executive enforcement
policies that are not promulgated pursuant to these procedures are not
“law,” and thus should not have preemptive force.124
In a partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion, Justice Alito
drew attention to this point in Arizona.125 He rejected the federal
government’s “remarkable” position that “a state law may be pre-empted,
not because it conflicts with a federal statute or regulation, but because it is
inconsistent with a federal agency’s current enforcement priorities . . .
[which] are not law.”126 But the majority did not directly engage this
objection. Instead, the Court relied on the Executive’s enforcement policies
as a ground (or partial basis) for preempting at least one, and maybe two, of
the Arizona provisions at issue.127
3. Equal Pro-Emption.—A third immigration federalism idea may
also be unfolding (or, depending on perspective, resurfacing) in the lower
courts. Today, some courts may be incorporating an equality norm into
preemption analysis in ways that load the dice against subfederal

123

See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000). In recent years, the
subject of administrative preemption has drawn extensive academic interest. Some commentators
support administrative preemption on constitutional and normative grounds. See, e.g., Thomas W.
Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 761–66 (2008); Gillian E.
Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2091–100 (2008); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 756–58 (2010); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2127–28, 2158–63
(2009); Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1593–94 (2008). Others,
however, have been far more critical of administrative preemption. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1430–38 (2001); David S. Rubenstein,
Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1153–63 (2012); Ernest A. Young, Executive
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 869–71 (2008).
124
Cf. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 580 (holding that nonbinding preamble to regulation could not have
preemptive effect). Outside of the immigration context, commentators that have addressed the issue are
generally of the view that agency policies must first undergo notice and comment, or otherwise have the
force of law, before these policies may have preemptive effect. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark
Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of
Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 2010–12 (2008); Merrill, supra note 123, at 761–66; Rubenstein,
supra note 29, at 129 n.247; Young, supra note 123, at 897–900; see also supra note 122 and
accompanying text (discussing force of law). Catherine Kim argues, however, that for immigration in
particular, nonbinding enforcement policies should nevertheless have preemptive effect. See Catherine
Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power to Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 691, 728–32 (2014). But see David S. Rubenstein, Black-Box Immigration Federalism, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 983, 1001–04 (2016) (taking the opposite view and explaining the problems with preemption
via nonbinding enforcement policies on constitutional and normative grounds).
125
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2527 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126
See id.
127
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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restrictionist laws.128 One of us has recently dubbed this idea “Equal ProEmption” to capture its hybrid composition.129
The Third Circuit’s pre-Arizona decision in Lozano v. City of
Hazleton arguably fits this mold.130 There, the court struck down
restrictionist city rental and employment ordinances on preemption
grounds. Yet, with seeming relevance, the court’s written opinion also
emphasized the employment ordinance’s discriminatory nature.131
More recently, in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer,132 the Ninth
Circuit offered an interesting twist on this theme. At issue was whether
Arizona’s policy of denying driver’s licenses to certain undocumented
immigrants violated equal protection or was otherwise preempted by
federal law.133 During the preliminary injunction phase, the Ninth Circuit
ruled against the state on equal protection grounds.134 Thus, the court had
no need to rule on preemption grounds and expressly declined to do so
(though it noted that the plaintiffs’ preemption claim was likely viable).135
However, in the permanent injunction phase, the court switched gears. Still
ruling against the state, the court invoked the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance and based its holding on preemption grounds.136
128

See Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption:
Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
10–40 (2013) (tracing this idea and its development in the pre-1980 era); Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights
of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1736–46 (2010)
(discussing the relationship between the preemption and equal protection arguments).
129
See Rubenstein, supra note 124, at 1006.
130
620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).
131
Id. at 217.
132
818 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied and opinion amended, 2017 WL 461503 (Feb. 2,
2017).
133
Id. at 905–06. More specifically, the Arizona policy precluded beneficiaries of the Obama
Administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program from receiving state
driver’s licenses, even though other classes of undocumented immigrants could receive such licenses.
Id. at 907.
134
Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that the policy
accepts Employment Authorization Documents as proof of lawful presence for two groups of similarly
situated immigrants but not for DACA recipients).
135
Id. at 1061–63.
136
Ariz. Dream Act Coal., 818 F.3d at 905–06, 920. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit deemed
preemption a nonconstitutional basis for deciding the case, despite preemption’s roots in the Supremacy
Clause. But, even assuming that statutory preemption can be deemed nonconstitutional, this logic would
not seem to extend to structural preemption via the exclusivity principle. Whereas statutory preemption
links to the Supremacy Clause’s coverage of “Laws . . . made in [p]ursuance [of the Constitution],”
structural preemption links to the Constitution itself. See supra notes 104–10 and accompanying text;
see also Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 93–96 (discussing the different sources of preemption under the
Supremacy Clause). Intentionally or not, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Arizona Dream Act Coalition
blurred past this distinction. Parts of its reasoning and language sounds in statutory field preemption
(insofar as it cited to the INA as the preemptive source); other parts, however, sound in structural
preemption (insofar as it cited to and uses the language of structural preemption cases). Ariz. Dream Act
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Older federalism cases also leveraged discrimination concerns as a
reason, or partial reason, for finding state immigration laws preempted.137
In some of those cases, the Court found actual equal protection violations
(thus establishing the predicate rights violation) and/or expressly invoked
the Civil Rights Act of 1870 (thus pinning preemption to a statute, rather
than a more nebulous equality norm).138
Yet, perhaps most important for present purposes, those earlier
decisions predate the Supreme Court’s subsequent developments in equal
protection and preemption jurisprudence.139 As compared to equal
protection, Equal Pro-Emption relaxes or departs from the Court’s general
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a discriminatory purpose when
challenging facially neutral laws.140 Indeed, circumventing the Court’s
mainstream equal protection jurisprudence may be the sine qua non of
Equal Pro-Emption.141 Moreover, the Court does not appear to be imbuing
preemption analysis with an equality norm in other areas of law. Thus,
even if Equal Pro-Emption was not exceptional fifty years ago, it might be
today if measured against the Court’s extant equal protection and
preemption doctrines.
C.

Separation of Powers

Many of the Court’s foundational immigration cases refer to the
federal government’s plenary power without differentiating between the

Coal., 818 F.3d at 914–17. For more discussion on this point, see Alan Vester, Comment, Hybrid
Immigration Preemption, 56 WASHBURN L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with authors).
137
See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 31, at 186–88 (describing how a handful of
immigration cases from the early- to mid-twentieth century intermingled preemption analysis with
discussions of discrimination).
138
See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376–77 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69–70 (1941). The key
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the
same right” as “white citizens” in “every State and Territory” to certain enumerated rights. See
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012).
139
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2492–511 (2012) (making no mention of the
Civil Rights Act of 1870, or an equality norm, in upholding one state law and preempting three others);
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 582–611 (2011) (upholding state law against
preemption challenge and making no mention of the Civil Rights Act of 1870); De Canas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351, 354–56 (1975) (finding that state law was not an “invalid state incursion on federal
power” without relying on grounds of the Equal Protection Clause or the Civil Rights Act of 1870); see
also Rubenstein, supra note 124, at 1006–12 (elaborating on these points).
140
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 269–70 (1977)
(holding that plaintiffs did not meet burden of proving racial discrimination, despite evidence of a
racially discriminatory impact); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring plaintiffs in
an equal protection suit to show evidence of discriminatory intent, and not just discriminatory impact).
141
MOTOMURA, supra note 24, at 135 (explaining how a judicially countenanced equality norm
can turn “a losing equal protection . . . challenge” into “a winning preemption challenge”).
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federal political branches.142 But what happens when congressional and
executive power come into conflict? That issue reached a boiling point
during the Obama Administration, owing to congressional gridlock and
President Obama’s insistence—in words and action—that “we can’t wait”
for Congress.143 And it is resurfacing again with President Trump’s
invocation of broad executive authority.
One place to look for answers is the Take Care Clause, which instructs
the President to “take Care that the laws be faithfully executed.”144 But the
parameters of this provision are murky.145 On some occasions, the Court
has conjured the Take Care Clause for the proposition that the President
cannot suspend or supersede Congress’s laws;146 at other times, however,
the Court has cited the Take Care Clause as the fount of inherent
prosecutorial discretion.147 Thus, even outside of the immigration context,
questions of executive authority vis-à-vis Congress remain unsettled in the
Court’s jurisprudence. Accordingly, separation of powers arguments about
the lawmaking relationship between the President and Congress commonly
draw from scholarly assessments, historical practice, and legal memoranda
from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel.

142

See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The power of exclusion
of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States . . .
cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.” (emphasis added)).
143
Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President on the Economy and Housing (Oct. 24,
2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/24/remarks-president-economyand-housing [https://perma.cc/D8FN-3C9A] (“So I’m here to say to all of you . . . we can’t wait for an
increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they won’t act, I will.”); Taking Action on
Immigration, supra note 4 (outlining President Obama’s immigration plans and actions).
144
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
145
See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
1835, 1838 (2016) (“The Court’s decisions rely heavily on the Take Care Clause but almost never
interpret it, at least not in any conventional way.”).
146
See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“In the
framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes
the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524,
613 (1838) (rejecting the notion that “the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully
executed[] implies a power to forbid their execution”); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–
33 n.4 (1985) (suggesting that judicial review might be available to review acts of executive abdication
of statutory responsibilities).
147
See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (concluding that the Attorney
General and U.S. Attorneys have wide prosecutorial discretion “because they are designated by statute
as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (“[A]n
agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the decision of a
prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the
special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the
Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)).
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The Court’s seminal decision in INS v. Chadha was the most direct, if
not the only, jurisprudential foray into the lawmaking relationship between
Congress and the Executive in immigration.148 In Chadha, the Court
famously struck down Congress’s “[l]egislative [v]eto,” which permitted
the House or Senate to overturn the Attorney General’s discretionary
decision to suspend the deportation of immigrants.149 According to the
Court, the legislative veto violated the Constitution’s bicameralism and
presentment requirements for federal lawmaking.150 Tellingly, the majority
opinion brushed the plenary power doctrine aside in this case.151
Although Chadha might indicate that normal separation of powers
principles apply to immigration, a broader historical perspective
complicates the picture. In an influential study, Professors Adam Cox and
Cristina Rodríguez suggest that the lawmaking relationship between the
President and Congress has vacillated over time between exceptional and
nonexceptional modes.152 They offer historical examples that arguably
involved unilateral presidential action, such as the Bracero Program in the
mid-twentieth century.153 On their account, this unilateralism was an
exercise of inherent executive authority, which might only be justified
through an exceptionalism frame.154 Similarly, in United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, the Court suggested that the Executive possessed
inherent and broad power over immigration.155
On the other hand, as Cox and Rodríguez explain, Congress has
delegated significant authority to the Executive Branch in more recent
148

462 U.S. 919, 934–35 (1983).
Id. at 925 n.2, 934, 959.
150
Id. at 955–58.
151
Id. at 940–44 (discussing whether the “plenary authority of Congress over aliens” made the
legislative veto provision a nonjusticiable political question but concluding that no political question
was presented); see also Legomsky, supra note 1, at 301–02 (arguing that in Chadha, “it seems clear
that the Court made a conscious decision not to apply the plenary power doctrine”).
152
Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J.
458, 461, 476–78 (2009) (“These alternative theories—one emphasizing immigration’s exceptional
position within the constitutional structure, the other its ordinary place in administrative law—raise the
question of which account better fits the historical contours of the relationship between the President
and Congress.”).
153
Id. at 485. The Bracero Program, which operated from 1942 to 1964, provided for temporary
Mexican laborers (“braceros”) to lawfully enter the United States on a seasonal basis to satisfy labor
demands in the United States. Id. at 485–90. For most of its existence, the Bracero Program was based
on a series of agreements between the United States and Mexico, most significantly the bilateral
agreements of 1942 and 1951. Id. These agreements detailed the volume and conditions under which
laborers from Mexico could work in the United States. For an excellent account of this program, see
BARBARA A. DRISCOLL, THE TRACKS NORTH: THE RAILROAD BRACERO PROGRAM OF WORLD WAR II
51–58 (1999).
154
Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 152, at 490–91.
155
338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).
149
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times.156 And, in turn, “the Court’s understanding of the relationship
between the branches [has taken] on more of the trappings of typical
separation of powers jurisprudence, with delegation serving as the primary
mechanism for power allocation.”157
But between these two poles of exceptional and mainstream executive
authority, Cox and Rodríguez describe a “two-principals” lawmaking
model that, in their view, best captures the immigration policymaking
relationship between the political branches today.158 Under this model, both
Congress and the President are independent sources of authority.
Fundamentally, the two-principals model rejects the conventional
principal–agent model. Under the latter, Congress and the President are
cast as principal and agent, respectively. As put by the Court in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer: “[T]he President’s power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker.”159

156

Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 152, at 490–91.
Id. at 476.
158
See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104, 110–11, 159–73 (2015) [hereinafter Cox & Rodriguez, Redux] (“Far from fitting
into a faithful-agent framework, therefore, our modern system of presidentially driven, ex post
immigration screening is better understood as embodying a ‘two-principals’ model of immigration
policymaking.”); see also Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 152, at 485 (“[T]he intricate rule-like
provisions of the immigration code, which on their face appear to limit executive discretion, actually
have had the effect of delegating tremendous authority to the President to set the screening rules for
immigrants—that is, to decide on the composition of the immigrant community.”).
159
343 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1952); see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446
(2014) (“The power of executing the laws . . . does not include a power to revise clear statutory terms
that turn out not to work in practice.”). At least as a formal matter, the OLC memorandum defending
DAPA ascribes to this conventional model, insofar as it attempts to anchor the Executive’s program to
ostensible congressional priorities reflected in the INA. The Department of Homeland Security’s
Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer
Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 1, 24 (2014) [hereinafter The Opinion], https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MCG9-Y7FK] (“[A]ny expansion of deferred action to new classes of aliens must be
carefully scrutinized to ensure that it reflects consideration within the agency’s expertise, and that it
does not seek to effectively rewrite the laws to match the Executive’s policy preferences, but rather
operates in a manner consonant with congressional policy expressed in the statute.”). In rejecting the
principal–agent model for immigration, Cox and Rodríguez also reject the reasoning (although not the
conclusions) of the OLC memorandum. Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 158, at 146 (“[T]he
[OLC’s] congressional priorities approach perpetuates a ‘faithful-agent’ model of law enforcement that
is neither descriptively accurate nor normatively attractive.”). For other treatments of OLC’s analysis,
see Peter Margulies, Deferred Action and the Bounds of Agency Discretion: Reconciling Policy and
Legality in Immigration Enforcement, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 143, 143 (2015) (critiquing OLC’s
congressional priorities analysis, inasmuch as it “ignores the context of compromises embedded” in the
INA (internal quotation marks omitted)); Zachary Price, Two Cheers for OLC’s Opinion,
BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/11/two-cheers-for-olcsopinion.html [https://perma.cc/E7JV-EG53] (commending OLC’s attempt to tie the Executive’s
157
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Last term, United States v. Texas presented the Court with a prime
opportunity to address the constitutional relationship between Congress and
the President in the context of immigration law (and more generally).160 At
issue was the legality of the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans (DAPA) program,161 which offered millions of
qualifying undocumented immigrants a multi-year and renewable reprieve
from deportation, the opportunity to work legally in the country, and other
associated benefits.162
Shortly after DAPA was announced, several states joined in a lawsuit
to challenge the program on separation of powers and administrative law
grounds.163 The Fifth Circuit preliminarily enjoined the program only on the
latter basis, skirting the separation of powers question.164 When the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, it specifically requested briefing on
whether DAPA violated the Take Care Clause.165 That issue, however,
received scant attention at oral argument, and no attention in the Court’s
one-sentence per curiam decision.166

enforcement program to congressional priorities, but expressing some skepticism about whether OLC
drew the correct conclusions with respect to that analysis, for immigration and beyond).
160
See 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)
(mem.) (per curiam). As earlier noted, the Court has provided spotty guidance on what the Take Care
Clause entails, especially for executive nonenforcement programs. See notes 144–47 and accompanying
text. Heckler v. Chaney, for instance, suggests in dicta that judicial review of agency action might be
warranted if an agency were to adopt a general policy that is an “abdication of its statutory
responsibilities.” 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 n.4 (1985). But the space between permissible prosecutorial
discretion, and executive “abdication” is potentially vast and heavily dependent on the particulars of
any given case. See id. at 831 (noting in the administrative law context that “an agency decision not to
enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise”); see also The Opinion, supra note 159, at 7 (noting that the President’s enforcement
discretion is not limitless and citing Heckler for the proposition that the Take Care Clause does not
permit the Executive to abdicate its statutory responsibilities). United States v. Texas thus presented the
Court with an opportunity to address this issue not only in the context of immigration, but perhaps more
generally.
161
Texas, 809 F.3d 134.
162
See DAPA Memo, supra note 11; see also DACA Memo, supra note 11.
163
Complaint, Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 1:14CV00254).
164
Texas, 809 F.3d 134.
165
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016) (granting certiorari and directing the parties to
address the additional question of whether federal immigration law guidance violates the Take Care
Clause).
166
See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (mem.) (per curiam) (The full opinion reads: “The
judgment [of the Fifth Circuit] is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”). At the time of decision, the
Court was a member short. Justice Scalia’s death left a vacancy on the Court that was not filled during
the 2015 Term, which continued into the 2016 Term. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the
Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/
antonin-scalia-death.html [https://perma.cc/W3M6-EAPY]. On February 20, 2017, DHS Secretary John
Kelly issued a guidance memoranda that expressly superseded the DAPA Memo. See Memorandum
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* * *
In sum, as a purely descriptive matter, immigration is exceptional
some of the time. But that is not to say it should be, much less for the
reasons or in the ways found in the Court’s jurisprudence. We now turn to
the rich scholarship addressed to these prescriptive questions.
II.

PRESCRIPTIVE EXCEPTIONALISM

As this Part explains, many (if not most) commentators engage
questions of immigration exceptionalism with a view toward vindicating
the rights and interests of immigrants. To that end, commentators
sometimes criticize the Court’s exceptional doctrines. At other times,
however, commentators work within or leverage exceptionalism to argue in
defense of particular immigration arrangements or policies.
When considered together, these doctrinal preferences seemingly
work toward a collection of ends along the rights, federalism, and
separation of powers dimensions. We refer to this set of normative
preferences as the “first-best scenario” from the vantage of immigrant
interests. Under this ideal: (1) immigrants would have robust rights
protections (the “rights preference”), (2) immigrants would be integrated
into our national community with state and local help, and, correlatively,
restrictionist subfederal policies would be preempted (the “federalism
preference”), and (3) the federal Executive would make enforcement
decisions and administrative programs that ease Congress’s harsh
deportation laws (the “separation-of-powers preference”).167
To start, it will be useful to appreciate that the first-best scenario for
immigrant interests likely depends on a propitious mix of rights
normalization and structural exceptionalism. If immigration is always
exceptional, then the rights preference cannot be realized. Conversely, if
immigration is never exceptional, then the federalism and separation of
powers preferences might not be realized. However, if immigration can be
treated exceptionally for some structural purposes, while treated normally
for constitutional rights, then perhaps the rights, federalism, and separation
of powers preferences sketched above can be realized simultaneously.
The catch, of course, is that creating and maintaining this equilibrium
may not be possible—for reasons we take up more fully in Parts III and IV.
The more immediate point is that the first-best scenario consists of a set of
from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S.
Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017).
167
These normative priors are amply reflected in the literature surveyed in the remainder of this
Part. Cf. Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 58 &
n.3 (“[T]he immigration law professoriate occupies a position at the extreme left in the national debate
over immigration.” (footnote omitted)).
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end-states that immigration exceptionalism may episodically support or
interfere with.
In this Part, we identify patterns and trends in the leading scholarly
works on exceptionalism, with due regard for some important nuance and
exceptions along the way. As a general matter, scholars tend to write about
exceptionalism pertaining to rights (Section II.A), federalism (Section
II.B), or separation of powers (Section II.C), as if developments in each
area can be siloed from the others.
A.

Rights

Theorists and advocates have labored for decades to eradicate rights
exceptionalism from the Court’s jurisprudence. Below, we offer a loose
taxonomy of that concerted effort, which includes: (1) dislodging the
plenary power doctrine from the Court’s rights jurisprudence, (2)
dismantling the doctrine’s conventional rationales, (3) detouring around the
doctrine, (4) disenabling the doctrine, and (5) denying the doctrine’s
existence or significance in modern times.168 Though conceptually distinct,
each of these tacks angles toward the same preference: namely, robust
rights protection for noncitizens.
Dislodge. One line of attack sought to extricate the plenary power
doctrine from rights jurisprudence. Most notably, Professor Stephen
Legomsky explained that the Court first invoked the doctrine in the context
of federalism challenges to state laws.169 He argued that the Court tragically
erred by extending the rationale of these federalism precedents to foreclose
judicial review of constitutional rights challenges.170 On this account, the
idea of federal plenary power is not wrong as applied to questions of
federalism; it is just misplaced as applied to constitutional rights.171
Dismantle. A related line of attack sought to topple the plenary power
doctrine by debunking its supporting rationales. In the foundational
Chinese Exclusion Cases, discussed in Part I, the Court linked federal
immigration power to foreign affairs and the inherent right of sovereign
nations.172 But as many thoughtful commentators have since argued, the
foreign affairs justification is overbroad. Much immigration policy, they
168

We present this taxonomy as one potential way of organizing the voluminous literature on rights
exceptionalism. While this categorization is meant to be helpful, nothing in our argument depends on
this particular grouping.
169
LEGOMSKY, supra note 39; see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power:
Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995) [hereinafter Legomsky,
Ten More Years] (reifying his earlier claim that the Court had unwittingly relied on federalism cases to
reach conclusions about individual constitutional rights).
170
See LEGOMSKY, supra note 39, at 180–86.
171
See id.
172
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889).
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argue, is domestic and has only tangential bearing on the nation’s foreign
relations.173 Moreover, some have argued, the sovereignty rationale as
pertains to constitutional rights challenges was probably wrong to begin
with, and is certainly wrong by contemporary lights.174 In short, sovereignty
is not a reason why the Constitution should not apply.
Detour. Some scholars have also suggested end-runs around the
plenary power doctrine and its rights-depriving effects. Again, in
groundbreaking work, Legomsky argued that the Court might use
mainstream procedural due process standards to compensate for the
inability to advance substantive constitutional rights claims.175 Building on
the work of Legomsky and others, Professor Hiroshi Motomura has
championed non-frontal assaults on the plenary power doctrine by linking
the fortunes of citizens and noncitizens.176 Motomura has also argued that
preemption doctrine might serve immigrant interests without having to
directly invoke constitutional rights—for example, by incorporating an
equality norm into preemption analysis.177 Approaches like these rely on
oblique proxies to vindicate immigrant rights.
Disenable. Somewhat more counterintuitively, Motomura has also
suggested severing the plenary power doctrine’s mainstream life supports.
Expanding on the work of others, Motomura explained in seminal work
that the plenary power’s staying power was owed, in part, to the Court’s
practice of importing “phantom” mainstream constitutional norms into
173

Legomsky, supra note 1, at 262–63 (suggesting that “[a] better approach would be to reserve
the judicial deference for the special case in which the court concludes, after a realistic appraisal, that
applying the normal standards of review would interfere with the conduct of foreign policy”);
Aleinikoff, supra note 2, at 12 (“While foreign policy has provided a convenient excuse, it hardly seems
to capture the deep structure of our thinking about immigration and the Constitution.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Schuck, supra note 1, at 16–17 (observing that foreign affairs has very little
if any bearing on the many domestic contexts where the Court invoked the plenary power doctrine);
Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” 68 FLA. L. REV. 179, 182–84 (2016) (same);
Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 340–41, 345–55 (2002)
(suggesting that the plenary power might fade as immigration law becomes decoupled from foreign
relations law). In a recent account, however, David Martin argues that the foreign affairs rationale is a
major reason why the plenary power doctrine endures today. See Martin, supra note 21, at 39–48.
174
See, e.g., LEGOMSKY, supra note 39, at 185 (“Problems with the sovereignty theory become
manifest when the rationales arguably supporting it are closely examined.”); Michael A. Scaperlanda,
Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 1028–29 (arguing that emergence of
modern human rights law renders classical international law’s emphasis on sovereignty obsolete).
175
Legomsky, supra note 1, at 298–305 (arguing that courts might apply greater procedural due
process analysis to immigration cases to “avoid[] the harshness of the plenary power doctrine”).
176
See Motomura, supra note 128, at 1728 (“[A]n unauthorized migrant may successfully assert
rights if recognizing those rights would protect a U.S. citizen or lawfully present noncitizen who serves
as a citizen proxy.”).
177
See id. at 1730; MOTOMURA, supra note 24, at 133–35. As discussed in Section II.B, this idea
has come into vogue in recent years, with wide-ranging support within the academy. See infra notes
207–16 and accompanying text (collecting citations).
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statutory interpretation in immigration rights cases.178 These phantom
norms effectively enabled the plenary power doctrine to endure, inasmuch
as they relaxed some of that doctrine’s more extreme applications.179
Motomura acknowledged that the phantom norms had salutary short-term
effects for immigrant interests.180 But, taking the longer view, he also
suggested that isolating the plenary power doctrine from the phantom
norms might, in due time, cause the plenary power doctrine to suffocate
under its own weight.181
Deny. Meanwhile, others have questioned the significance of the
plenary power doctrine. Ultimately, this nothing-to-see-here approach
hoped to convince courts and commentators that immigration law need not
be exceptional as a descriptive matter, and therefore should not be treated
as such as a prescriptive matter. Professor Jack Chin, for example, has
argued that despite the Court’s homage to the doctrine, the Court would
have reached the same result in most cases using then-extant mainstream
legal standards.182 A similar tack is reflected in the amicus brief filed by
several scholars in the Rodriguez case pending before the Court,183 and in
commentators’ responses to President Trump’s recent immigration ban.184

178

Motomura, supra note 41, at 549 (“[M]any courts have relied on what I call phantom
constitutional norms, which are not indigenous to immigration law but come from mainstream public
law instead. The result has been to undermine the plenary power doctrine through statutory
interpretation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 612 n.374 (recognizing that “[f]or a while,” abandoning phantom norms may result in
“aliens . . . los[ing] a few more immigration cases than before,” but anticipating “that this movement
will hasten the complete demise of the plenary power doctrine”).
182
Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for
Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 281–82
(2000) (arguing that the plenary power doctrine arose at a time of general judicial deference and that
immigration law may not be as much of a constitutional outlier as scholars conventionally believe). But
cf. Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to “Is there a Plenary
Power Doctrine?,” 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 291–96 (2000) (responding to Professor Chin and
arguing that de facto racial discrimination in immigration enforcement, and the disparate treatment of
noncitizens in removal proceedings, suggests a continued gap between immigration law and mainstream
constitutional law).
183
Brief of Professors of Constitutional, Immigration, and Administrative Law as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 3, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (No. 15-1204). Their
argument supports the immigrants’ position that indefinite or prolonged detention without bond
hearings are unlawful. Id. Specifically, their brief argues that the federal government reads Shaughnessy
v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), too broadly. Id. In that Cold War era case, the Court upheld the
government’s indefinite detention of a noncitizen who was deemed inadmissible under the immigration
laws. Id. To minimize Mezei’s impact, amici in Jennings argue that Mezei was a product of then-extant
due process standards and is not the controlling precedent today. See id. at 25.
184
See, e.g., Adam Cox, Why a Muslim Ban Is Likely to Be Held Unconstitutional: The Myth of
Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 30, 2017, 10:21 AM), https://
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As discussed in Section I.A, the plenary power doctrine has proven
remarkably resilient despite these academic assaults.185 That outcome is
relevant to this Article’s broader claims in two regards. First, decades of
scholarship have ably advanced many reasons to abrogate, relax, work
around, and compensate for the plenary power doctrine. Still, judicial buyin is required. How that happens, if at all, can impact other exceptionalism
strands, as we develop more fully in Parts III and IV. Second, the academic
refrain against rights exceptionalism provides contextual contrast to how
commentators engage questions of immigration exceptionalism for
federalism and separation of powers.
B.

Federalism

Most immigration scholars tend to affirm or defend the plenary power
doctrine and its corollaries as they pertain to federalism.186 At least as
applied to certain restrictionist laws, commentators defend or accept three
strands of federalism exceptionalism: (1) the federal exclusivity principle,
(2) preemption via nonbinding executive enforcement policies, and (3)
Equal Pro-Emption (i.e., importing an equality norm into statutory
preemption analysis).
1. The Exclusivity Principle.—Most commentators not only defend
the exclusivity principle, but also support a rather robust version of it.187 To
date, however, this support targets subfederal restrictionist measures for
preemption (e.g., the policies in Arizona and Alabama), but not
integrationist measures (e.g., the policies in New York and California).188
Some scholars, for instance, have specifically invoked the plenary
power doctrine as a reason to preempt restrictionist state laws like
Arizona’s flagship S.B. 1070.189 Other scholars have not overtly summoned
www.justsecurity.org/36988/muslim-ban-held-unconstitutional-myth-unconstrained-immigrationpower/ [https://perma.cc/K5WR-WUSX].
185
Cf. Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra note 169, at 934 (lamenting that time was not kind to his
earlier predictions regarding the demise of the plenary power doctrine and that, more likely, “the lower
courts and the Supreme Court [will] allow the plenary power doctrine to wear away by attrition”).
186
This point has been made before. See Schuck, supra note 167, at 57–58 (“An interesting feature
of these critiques of the plenary power doctrine is that the critics seem to have no difficulty accepting its
corollary—the principle that federal authority over immigration preempts the states from playing any
independent role in the development and administration of immigration law and policy.”). Professor
Schuck suggests that “[t]his conjunction of positions, which might otherwise seem illogical or at least
awkward, is probably best explained by ideology and politics.” Id. at 58.
187
For dissenting views, see infra notes 193–98 and accompanying text.
188
See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text (describing differences between restrictionist and
integrationist laws, and providing examples).
189
See, e.g., Karla M. McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal” Immigrants Beware: Local
Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1,
26 (2007) (arguing that “because immigrants’ civil rights are implicated . . . the plenary powers doctrine
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the plenary power doctrine, but nevertheless defend the idea of federal
exclusivity in immigration enforcement for a variety of immigrationspecific reasons. For example, Professor Michael Olivas argues that state
exercises of “general immigration functions are unconstitutional as a
function of exclusive federal preemptory powers.”190 And Professor Huyen
Pham maintains that “the immigration power is an exclusively federal
power that must be exercised uniformly.”191 Other notable scholars advance
similar views.192
Still, there are some important exceptions to this general trend.
Professor Peter Spiro, for example, argues that the rationale for federal
exclusivity melts away once immigration law is untethered from the faux
foreign policy rationale.193 For this and some additional reasons, Professors
Cristina Rodríguez, Clare Huntington, and Peter Schuck (writing
separately) have eschewed the idea of federal exclusivity on constitutional
and functional grounds.194
Here, it is important to appreciate that both sides of this particular
debate take immigrant interests into account, albeit to greater and lesser
extents relative to other considerations. For example, Spiro’s well known
“steam-valve” theory suggests that federal exclusivity may, on balance,

should be applied to broadly preclude municipal regulation”). For a description of the provisions of S.B.
1070 that were at issue in Arizona, see supra note 14.
190
Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice,
and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 34.
191
Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local
Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 967 (2004).
192
See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 581–82 (2012) (criticizing the Arizona Court’s underenforcement of the
exclusivity principle); Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 539–40
(2012) (arguing that state attempts to create strict immigration policy via “mirror-image” laws interfere
with federal power); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187,
35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 215–16 (1994) (explaining why states cannot lawfully resort to immigration
“self-help”); Wishnie, supra note 112, at 500 (“Congress’s 1996 effort to devolve its federal
immigration power [to subfederal institutions] is constitutionally impermissible.”).
193
Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L.
121, 165–67 (1994).
194
See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 567, 571–72 (2008) (arguing that the federal exclusivity principle “has become a formal
doctrine without strong constitutional justification,” and urging a functional approach to immigration
federalism); Huntington, supra note 69, at 792 (arguing that “[t]he text and structure of the Constitution
allow for shared authority” and that “nothing in Supreme Court precedent clearly supports a claim of
structural preemption”); Schuck, supra note 167, at 64 (arguing “that the legitimate goals of federal
immigration policy might be better served by recognizing state authority in certain areas,” including, in
particular, “employment-based admissions, integration with state and local criminal justice systems, and
employer sanctions”).
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inure to the detriment of immigrants.195 He argues that allowing limited
outlets for subfederal restrictionist fervor may dissipate political pressure to
enact more encompassing restrictionist laws at the federal level.196
Meanwhile, Rodríguez cautions that a robust exclusivity principle threatens
to preempt subfederal integrationist laws.197 And, as Huntington explains,
“there is no structural reason to believe that one level of government will
be more or less welcoming to non-citizens and therefore, on this basis, to
favor [federal] uniformity over [state and local] experimentalism.”198
To be clear, we draw attention to these sorts of mediating arguments
not because we think these scholars’ constitutional claims are
consequentially motivated. Rather, the point is that calls for normalization
that cut against the academic grain are almost invariably paired with some
explanation for why doing so could be advantageous for immigrant
interests, or at least not as dangerous as other immigration scholars
generally believe.
2. Executive Preemption via Nonbinding Policy.—In the wake of
recent congressional gridlock over comprehensive immigration reform, a
separate immigration federalism debate is brewing over whether executive
enforcement policies that do not have the force of law can nevertheless
preempt subfederal alienage laws. Most immigration scholars have taken
this mode of preemption for granted. That is, they start from the general
premise that federal law preempts state law, and then extend this idea to
include nonbinding executive policies.199
The few immigration scholars who have directly grappled with this
form of executive preemption generally support it, at least as applied to
restrictionist laws. Cox, for example, suggests that federal–state
enforcement redundancy is ill-suited for immigration, given the
Executive’s vast discretion in the field.200 Along similar lines, Motomura
argues that “law in action” is just as much a part of federal immigration law
as Congress’s written statutes, and thus should have corresponding
195

See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627

(1997).
196

Id. at 1645.
Rodríguez, supra note 194, at 580 (noting that subfederal protectionist measures are “vulnerable
in the face of a strong theory of preemption”); see also Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal
Authorization for Alienage Discrimination by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 363–64
(2002) (“[W]e might just as plausibly view federal authorization of divergent state policies as creating
laboratories of generosity toward immigrants.” (emphasis removed)).
198
Huntington, supra note 69, at 831.
199
But cf. Rubenstein, supra note 124, at 985–86 (arguing that preemption via nonbinding
executive enforcement policies is a dangerous proposition that “should not be taken for granted—
perhaps especially by immigrant advocates”).
200
See Cox, supra note 29, at 56–59.
197
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preemptive effect.201 Meanwhile, Professor Catherine Kim argues that
preemption via executive policies that forgo notice-and-comment
rulemaking may not be ideal, but is preferable to a regime without this
exceptionality.202
Still, there is at least one dissenting view.203 On formal grounds,
nonbinding enforcement policies are not “law,” much less are they “Law”
for purposes of the Supremacy Clause.204 Moreover, on functional grounds,
preemption via nonbinding executive action arguably makes it too easy for
a sufficiently motivated Executive to preempt state alternatives, and thus
unilaterally quell one of the few remaining structural checks against federal
immigration policy.205 Worth noting, however, is how this critique also has
immigrant interests in view. Preemption via nonbinding executive policies
could permit executive branch officials to preempt state integrationist laws
(as well as restrictionist laws) with equal facility—a point we return to in
Part IV.206
3. Equal Pro-Emption.—Recall that under the proposed Equal ProEmption doctrine, courts would import an equality norm into immigration
preemption analysis. The idea for this is old.207 Its popularity today is
new.208
201

See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 24, at 22, 124 (“The operation of immigration law in practice
strongly suggests that the exercise of federal executive discretion in enforcement supplies the real
content of federal immigration law for the purpose of deciding what is inconsistent with state and local
decisions.”).
202
See Kim, supra note 124, at 731.
203
That dissenting view has been advanced by one of this Article’s authors. See, e.g., Rubenstein,
supra note 120, at 283–95; Rubenstein, supra note 124, at 999–1004.
204
See Rubenstein, supra note 124, at 999–1004; U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (delineating “Laws” as
having preemptive effect).
205
On this account, executive preemption via nonbinding policies may be worse, on balance, than
insisting on the Court’s mainstream force of law preemption requirement (which embeds procedural
resistance within the administrative apparatus), and/or having Congress decide whether to preempt
subfederal law (which embeds political and procedural resistance through the legislative process). See,
e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 139–51.
206
See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C; see also Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 89–90, 139–51 (warning
of danger to immigrant interest if preemption through executive guidance policies becomes established
doctrine).
207
See Note, State Burdens on Resident Aliens: A New Preemption Analysis, 89 YALE L.J. 940
(1980); David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?,
31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1979) (arguing that Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis is
unintelligible and that opinions actually reflect “an unarticulated theory of preemption” that should be
explicitly embraced).
208
See MOTOMURA, supra note 24, at 133–35; Chacón, supra note 192, at 606–14; Mary D. Fan,
Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-“Alien” Laws and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for
Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 932–43 (2011); Guttentag, supra note 128; Kevin
R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L.
REV. 609, 619 (2012); Motomura, supra note 128, at 1726; Olivas, supra note 190, at 28; Carrie L.
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Academic support for this exceptional doctrine must be understood in
context. Most commonly, Equal Pro-Emption is offered as a partial reason
for why subfederal restrictionist (but not integrationist) laws should be
preempted. Motomura and Guttentag, for example, argue that incorporating
equality concerns is a principled way for reviewing courts to greet
subfederal restrictionist laws with greater skepticism.209 Restrictionist laws,
they argue, are likely to be motivated by discrimination in ways that
integrationist laws are not.210
Alternatively, Equal Pro-Emption may be understood as a
compensating adjustment for the Court’s rights jurisprudence. As
Motomura explains, the Court’s mainstream discriminatory purpose test for
facially neutral laws leaves many discriminatory enforcement actions
undetected or unremedied.211 Shifting the burden of proof to restrictionist
states to disprove discriminatory intent might close some of the gap
between the equality norm and the Court’s mainstream disparate purpose
test.212 Similarly, Professor Jennifer Chacón argues that importing an
equality norm into immigration preemption analysis could venerably
compensate for the Court’s lax application of Fourth Amendment
principles in immigration enforcement.213
Professor Mary Fan offers yet another reason to support, or at least to
understand, Equal Pro-Emption.214 As she explains, this doctrinal construct
not only eases the plaintiff’s burden of proving discriminatory intent, it also
eases the judicial burden of having to directly rule on antidiscrimination
grounds.215 Moreover, inasmuch as Equal Pro-Emption is grounded in an
antidiscrimination norm, it is arguably preferable to alternative preemption
Rosenbaum, The Role of Equality Principles in Preemption Analysis of Sub-Federal Immigration Laws:
The California TRUST Act, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 481, 483, 523 (2015); Michael J. Wishnie, State and
Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004). And, for a variation
on this theme, see Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: Deportation and Proportionality in the
Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (suggesting a “proportionality norm” as an
alternative or at least additional factor motivating the Court’s preemption analysis in Arizona).
209
Cf. MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION, supra note 24, at 134; Lucas Guttentag, Immigration
Preemption and the Limits of State Power: Reflections on Arizona v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 1 (2013).
210
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION, supra note 24, at 134; Guttentag, supra note 209, at 2 & n.4
(2013).
211
See MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION, supra note 24, at 135.
212
See id.; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1976) (requiring plaintiff to
demonstrate a discriminatory purpose, not merely a discriminatory impact, when challenging facially
neutral laws under the Equal Protection Clause); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1, 16–17 (2013) (describing the development of this equal protection requirement).
213
See Chacón, supra note 192, at 613.
214
Fan, supra note 208.
215
Id. at 908–09 (noting that preemption frames can often be more “palatable” than
antidiscrimination frames in judicial review of subfederal restrictionist laws).
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frames (such as the exclusivity principle, and mainstream preemption
doctrines), which are formally agnostic to equality principles.216
C.

Separation of Powers

The academic reception for special separation of powers standards in
immigration law is also mixed, at least as refracted through the debate over
the Obama Administration’s DAPA and Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) programs. Many immigration professors defend the
legality of these programs,217 but it is far less clear how much of their legal
support for the programs depends on exceptionalism, if at all.218
Just as we noted in Section I.C that separation of powers
exceptionality is hard to pin down descriptively, here we suggest three
reasons why it is hard to pin down prescriptively. First, the Court has
provided only sporadic and somewhat fuzzy parameters on what the
President’s duty to “faithfully execute the law” entails.219 Without a clear
baseline set by the Court against which to compare, judgments about what
qualifies as exceptional executive action defy precision.
Second, because the INA delegates so much authority, the Executive
Branch might not be acting exceptionally even when it acts without express
congressional endorsement. Under mainstream separation of powers
precedent, for instance, the court might employ the familiar three-tier
framework from Youngstown to assess the constitutionality of executive
action.220 Even then, however, it is not clear where to situate DAPA/DACA
216

Id. at 909–10.
See Open Letter from Immigration Law Professors 6 (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/executive-action-law-profletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5QU-2GWG] (letter of support signed by approximately one hundred law
professors and clinicians); Letter from Immigration Law Professors, to Barack Obama, President, White
House 4 (May 28, 2012), http://www.nilc.org/document.htmlid=754 [https://perma.cc/8ZVY-52E8]
(same).
218
Indeed, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion providing legal cover for DAPA maintains that
Congress provided sufficient authority for these exercises of executive authority in existing statutes.
The Opinion, supra note 159, at 4. But see Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II:
Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 216 (2015) (critiquing OLC’s reasoning);
Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 158, at 146–57 (critiquing OLC’s reasoning but defending DAPA
on other grounds); Zachary Price, supra note 159 (arguing that DACA and DAPA “go beyond either
conventional agency priority-setting or ad hoc deferred action by deeming broad categories of
immigrants presumptively eligible for a prospective promise of non-enforcement”).
219
See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
220
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). The framework divides exercises of presidential power into three categories: First, “[w]hen
the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Id.
at 635 (footnote omitted). Second, “in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, . . .
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority.” Id. at 637. Finally,
217
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within Youngstown’s three tiers, because it is not clear whether or how
immigration’s special qualities should factor in that analysis.221 Moreover,
if DAPA/DACA is not an act of executive lawmaking (and conceived,
instead, only as executive prosecutorial discretion), then Youngstown may
not be the appropriate constitutional standard.
Third, commentators shying away from explicitly invoking
exceptionalism tropes may purposefully blur the line between
exceptionalism and normalization. The potential dangers inhering in an
exceptional executive immigration power may be reason enough to avoid
relying on (or reifying) that power. Quite obviously, executive power can
be abused in ways that make it more concerning than other forms of
exceptionalism. Thus, prudence might have counseled for defending
President Obama’s deferred action programs on mainstream grounds (if
possible), and exceptionalism grounds (if at all) only as a backup.
The brouhaha surrounding DAPA and DACA bring these potential
hedges to light. As noted, most immigration scholars defend these
programs without relying on exceptionalism per se.222 Still, we think it’s
fair to say that some scholars may be turning to one or more of
immigration’s special features to argue for special (even if not unique or
exceptional) legal dispensation.
For instance, Cox and Rodríguez (writing together), as well as
Motomura, have argued that the conventional principal–agent model
between Congress and the Executive is ill-equipped for immigration.223
“[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, . . .
he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over
the matter.” Id. To succeed in this third category, the President’s asserted power must be both
“exclusive” and “conclusive” on the issue. Id. at 637–38.
221
For instance, Professor Lauren Gilbert argues that DACA, and presumably DAPA too, “falls
within Justice Jackson’s twilight zone, which allows the President to act in cases of ‘congressional
inertia, indifference, or quiescence,’ particularly where Congress and the Executive enjoy concurrent
authority.” Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of
Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 279 (2013) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637
(Jackson, J., concurring)). Meanwhile, Professor Peter Margulies employs mainstream norms to argue
that DAPA falls into Youngstown’s third tier and is unconstitutional. Peter Margulies, The Boundaries
of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Present, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV.
1183, 1253–54 (2015). Professor Josh Blackman has gone even further, to argue that DAPA
“descend[s] . . . even below the lowest ebb.” Josh Blackman, supra note 218, at 267 (internal quotation
marks omitted). For an intriguing approach to Youngstown, which factors in federalism, see Bianca
Figueroa-Santana, Note, Divided We Stand: Constitutionalizing Executive Immigration Reform Through
Subfederal Regulation, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2219, 2257 (2015) (“[When] evaluating the
constitutionality of executive action within the traditional Youngstown framework, . . . subfederal power
and prerogative function as a fourth ‘zone,’ capable of supplementing or undermining the legitimacy of
unilateral presidential policy.”).
222
See supra notes 217, 221.
223
MOTOMURA, supra note 24, at 21–22, 31, 124 (“The operation of immigration law in practice
strongly suggests that the exercise of federal executive discretion in enforcement supplies the real
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Instead, their dynamic lawmaking models place a premium on historical
context, and, more generally, an immigration regime characterized by a
significant mismatch between the law on the books and the law in action.
Broader still, one might also maintain—as they and others do—that
programs like DAPA and DACA have always been within the purview of
the Executive Branch. As policy guidance, the Executive is best poised to
make such decisions and routinely does. On this telling, DAPA and DACA
are unexceptional exercises of presidential authority; they are distinguished
only by the transparency and formality attending these programs, not
because the President plays by different rules in immigration. Although
some scholars may engage this defense agnostic of its relationship to
broader immigration law implications, for others like Cox and Rodríguez,
this line of argumentation may be appealing precisely because it may help
avoid relying on claims of immigration exceptionalism.
Meanwhile, Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and others
emphasize a long tradition of categorical nonenforcement programs and
congressional acquiescence thereof.224 Again, this line of argument does not
invoke exceptionalism per se. And we mean to leave open whether these
arguments sound in exceptionalism at all.225 But, even if not intended,
heavy reliance on past immigration practice may be perceived as having
exceptionalism undertones. After all, those earlier practices, themselves,
may have been expressions of exceptional immigration power.226 In any
content of federal immigration law for the purpose of deciding what is inconsistent with state and local
decisions.”); Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 158, at 112 (arguing that a dynamic lawmaking
model for immigration is more descriptively accurate and normatively desirable); see also Jason A.
Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 694–719 (2015) (defending
DACA/DAPA on the ground that the Executive must take the lead in the equitable enforcement of
immigration law, especially in the wake of congressional gridlock on comprehensive immigration
reform).
224
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES ch. 4 (2015); Open Letter from Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia et al.
(Mar. 13, 2015), www.pennstatelaw.psu.edu/lawprofltrlawsuit [https://perma.cc/Y9EE-HNWM]; see
also Executive Grants of Temporary Immigration Relief, 1956-Present, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Oct.
2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/executive-grants-temporary-immigrationrelief-1956-present [https://perma.cc/XMS4-M8EU]; Drew Desilver, Executive Actions on Immigration
Have a Long History, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/11/21/executive-actions-on-immigration-have-long-history/ [https://perma.cc/R2VT-BT3Y].
225
See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Employment Authorization and Prosecutorial Discretion: The
Case for Immigration Unexceptionalism, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/employment-authorization-and-prosecutorial-discretion-the-case-forimmigration-unexceptionalism-by-s/ [https://perma.cc/9FUQ-UZ5K].
226
There is another strand of DACA/DAPA defenses that focuses on the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in all branches of law enforcement. This tack, of course, attempts to normalize the exercise of
enforcement relief in the immigration context. See, e.g., David A. Martin, A Defense of ImmigrationEnforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 167, 184 (2012) (arguing that the lawsuit filed by ICE field agents challenging DACA—Crane
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event, we wish only to flag what we think the foregoing defenses of DAPA
and DACA share in common: reliance on immigration’s distinct
demographics, history, or the INA’s statutory structure as reasons for a
flexible view of executive power, relaxed judicial checks on that authority,
or both.
To be sure, not all agree that large-scale deferred action programs are
constitutional. Tellingly, however, those dissenting views are more clearly
applying mainstream separation of powers and administrative law.227 As far
are we are aware, no one has argued that DAPA is unconstitutional under
an exceptionalism frame. Indeed, if the Executive does hold exceptional
immigration power, then it is not at all clear if, or on what grounds, the
Court would ever deem the constitutional line crossed.
* * *
In sum, immigration exceptionalism is more than just a doctrinal
phenomenon; it has prescriptive bents too.228 For decades, commentators
have labored to mitigate the injustices wrought by rights exceptionalism.
By comparison, however, academic reception for structural exceptionalism
is mixed.
This equivocation might signal differences in judgment about how
specific strands of exceptionalism are likely to translate on the ground.
Rights exceptionalism is almost invariably bad from the vantage of
immigrant interests. Put otherwise, those interests seemingly have nothing
to lose, and much to gain, from a normalized rights jurisprudence. By
contrast, separation of powers and federalism doctrines allocate power, but
cannot control how that exceptional power is used (or abused) across time
and contexts. Thus, inasmuch as scholars and advocates are writing with an
eye toward vindicating immigrant interests, there is arguably more reason
to equivocate when it comes to federalism and separation of powers
exceptionality. Doubling down on special structural doctrines, before all
the political cards are dealt, is a risky gambit.

v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013)—must be rejected and remarking that “[i]n any
other law enforcement environment, this discipline [of a ranking enforcement officer creating
enforcement priorities that bind lower level officers] would be unremarkable”).
227
See Robert Delahunty & John Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement
of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 71 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013)
(arguing that DACA is unconstitutional); Price, supra note 159 (same); Blackman, supra note 218, at
218–19 (same). See generally Margulies, supra note 221, at 1252–55 (rejecting the notion of an
exceptional executive power in immigration, on constitutional and normative grounds).
228
Cf. Cox, supra note 29, at 32 (writing about academic reactions to Arizona and noting that
“while [exceptionalism] . . . can provide a label for a phenomenon, it does not itself explain it”).
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III.

EXCEPTIONALISM AS MEANS TO ENDS

If we are correct that immigrant advocates and scholars often invoke
exceptionalism as a means to particularized ends, a pressing follow-up
question surfaces: to what extent can doctrinal exceptionalism (or
normalization) deliver those ends? That question has been almost entirely
neglected to date. And the scant attention it has received is generally
cabined to a particular constitutional dimension.229
This Part explains why exceptionalism is a fraught means to ends.
Section III.A revisits the rationales behind immigration exceptionalism. As
we explain, the most commonly invoked supporting tropes repeat
themselves across doctrines and constitutional dimensions. Section III.B
emphasizes why that matters. Exceptionalism’s supporting rationales tend
to be doctrinally agnostic. Thus, gestational moves toward exceptionalism
or normalization in one doctrinal context can push or pull on other
doctrines, sometimes in crosscutting and unintended ways. In Section III.C,
we inject an additional complication inherent in structural power
allocations—namely, political uncertainty.
Appreciation for these doctrinal and political dynamics is crucial.
Descriptively, our account may help to explain why exceptionalism
endures. Immigrant advocates, government lawyers, and jurists are quite
possibly caught in a feedback loop. Each may be invoking exceptionalism’s
supporting tropes for different reasons and for different ends. But the
emergent result is the same: exceptionalism lingers.
Prescriptively, this reconceptualization may profitably inform how to
engage questions of immigration exceptionalism (and normalization)
moving forward. As yet, there is no organizing theory for when, why, or
how to split the atom of immigration exceptionalism. Moreover, even
assuming that advocates and theorists can meet the conceptual challenge of
explaining why doctrines should be treated discretely, it may be too much
to expect the Court to seize upon an exceptionalism-splitting theory that
delivers just enough, but not too much, exceptionalism and in all the right
places.
The political x-factor only compounds the complexity. Rights,
federalism, and separation of powers doctrines set outer boundaries on how
government actors can and cannot exercise power, but create no affirmative
duty on government actors to exercise power in any particular way. It is in
that space, between politics and the outmost limits of law, where the

229

See supra Section II.B (canvassing debate over immigration federalism doctrines); cf.
Margulies, supra note 221, at 1215–16 (cautioning how arguments in favor of excessive executive
authority might be spun under new administrations).
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consequences of exceptionalism can become terribly unstable and
unpredictable.
A.

Cross-Currency of Exceptionalism Rationales

We start with a simple but central insight that often goes overlooked:
immigration exceptionalism needs reasons. After all, the Court does not,
and will not, depart from mainstream legal norms without explanation. Nor
should we expect the Court to abandon or limit long-standing
exceptionalism doctrines without disclosing why. In short, reasons matter.
Moreover, the reasons conventionally offered in support and derogation of
exceptional immigration doctrines link across constitutional settings. To
illustrate, we focus below on three commonly invoked exceptionalism
rationales: foreign affairs, institutional competence, and sovereignty.
In the rights realm, for instance, the Court invokes foreign affairs as
one of several reasons for judicial deference to the federal political
branches.230 Meanwhile, in federalism cases, the Court invokes the foreign
affairs trope to justify robust preemption of state and local restrictionist
laws.231 And, at other times, the Court nods to the President’s role in
foreign affairs to legitimate broad executive discretion,232 if not also
inherent immigration authority.233
Likewise, the institutional-competence rationale cuts across doctrinal
contexts. It surfaces in constitutional rights cases as a primary reason for
judicial deference to the federal political branches.234 It surfaces in
federalism as a primary reason why the federal government, rather than
states, should have exclusive control over the admission and expulsion of

230

See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (abjuring stringent judicial
review of the Chinese Exclusion Act and explaining that “[i]f the government of the country of which
the foreigners excluded are subjects is dissatisfied with this action it can make complaint to the
executive head of our government”).
231
See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (explaining that the federal
government’s authority over immigration “rests, in part, on . . . its inherent power as sovereign to
control and conduct relations with foreign nations” (citation omitted)); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 62–66 (1941) (noting foreign affairs implications of immigration regulation); Chy Lung v. Freeman,
92 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1875) (invoking foreign affairs as a reason for the exclusivity principle).
232
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (“The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires
the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign
policy with respect to these and other realities.”).
233
See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (suggesting that the
Executive possesses inherent power to regulate immigration as part of a broader foreign affairs power
vested in the Executive).
234
See, e.g., Chae, 130 U.S. at 602 (“The question whether our government is justified in
disregarding its engagements with another nation is not one for the determination of the courts.”).
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immigrants.235 And it surfaces in separation of powers as a reason for
judicial solicitude to the Executive’s enforcement decisions.236
The sovereignty rationale threads a similar pattern. In the Chinese
Exclusion Cases, for example, the Court infamously invoked national
sovereignty as one basis for the federal government’s plenary power over
immigration, which the Court felt ill-equipped to second guess.237 The
sovereignty rationale has jurisprudential links to federalism too, with
respect to preemption.238 Moreover, the recent Texas litigation suggests
how sovereignty links to separation of powers. Throughout that litigation,
the federal government cautioned that, if the Court affords states special
solicitude to challenge the federal Executive’s policies, it would invite
endless litigation anytime a state disagreed with federal policy, thus
distorting the relationship between federal and state sovereignty.239 But, in
retort, Texas cautioned that if states do not have standing to challenge
DAPA, then nobody might, thus leaving important separation of powers
questions unchecked by courts.240
235

See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498–500 (detailing the complex involvement of several federal
departments and agencies in immigration policy, and stating that “[i]t is fundamental that foreign
countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals . . . must be able to confer
and communicate . . . with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate [s]tates.”).
236
See, e.g., Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543 (“[T]he decision to admit or to exclude an alien may be
lawfully placed with the President. . . . [I]t is not within the province of any court, . . . to review the
determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien.”); The Opinion, supra
note 159, at 4 (defending legality of President Obama’s DAPA program by stating that “[t]he principles
of enforcement discretion . . . apply with particular force in the context of immigration”); see also
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 (“The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the
Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy
with respect to these and other realities.”).
237
Chae, 130 U.S. at 609 (linking “[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners” to the “sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States”); see also Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power
Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 617–18 (2013) (observing that “plenary power and structural
immigration preemption are distinct concepts,” but that “early cases articulating the two doctrines drew
on the same logic”).
238
See supra notes 83–85, 174 and accompanying text.
239
Brief for the Petitioners at 31, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674) (“In
the immigration context alone, the court of appeals’ theory would give States virtually unfettered ability
to conscript courts into entertaining their complaints about federal policies.”).
240
See Brief for the State Respondents at 35–36, Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (No. 15-674) (“It is
aggressive enough to insist that States—which possess the dignity of sovereignty—are powerless to
challenge DAPA’s legality. But defendants go further. At several points, they make clear that they
believe nobody can challenge DAPA.”); see also David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram,
United States v. Texas: Ex Ante or Ex Post Judicial Review?, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT
BLOG (June 9, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/united-states-v-texas-ex-ante-or-ex-post-judicial-reviewby-david-s-rubenstein-pratheepan-gulasekara/ [https://perma.cc/7C3P-Y4T5] (discussing an alternative
route to judicial review, whereby states might take oppositional action—as in Arizona, for example—
and raise objections to executive enforcement policies in the posture of a defendant, thus avoiding the
need for the state to establish standing).
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To be clear, we are not concerned here with whether the foregoing
rationales are good ones in any context, much less which contexts. Our
point is more foundational: the conventional reasons for immigration
exceptionalism proffered in the Court’s doctrine, academic commentary,
and litigation briefs, are not easily cabined to a particular doctrine or
constitutional dimension. Rather, the reasons form a network of
exceptionalism rationales, plugged into all three constitutional dimensions.
B.

Doctrinal Spillovers

We now turn to the implications of exceptionalism’s common-root
system. Foremost, doctrinal moves and prescriptive arguments in one
doctrinal setting can have lateral effects on others. We call this
phenomenon a “doctrinal spillover.” As illustrated below, the outcomes of
spillovers can be for better or worse (depending on perspective), and can
occur intra-dimensionally (e.g., between two federalism doctrines) and
inter-dimensionally (e.g., across federalism, separation of powers, and
rights doctrines).
The plenary power doctrine, itself, is a remarkable example of an
inter-dimensional spillover. Recall that the Court’s application of this
doctrine in rights cases drew inspiration from prior immigration federalism
cases.241 In short, the Court’s rationale for uniformity in national
immigration policy vis-à-vis the states (in federalism cases) exerted a
shadowing influence on the Court’s role vis-à-vis federal political branches
(in rights cases). Only with the benefit of hindsight did it become apparent
how foundational federalism victories for immigrants—which struck down
restrictionist state laws—became the fount for rights-depriving federal laws
shielded by the plenary power doctrine.
But, spinning that story further, it was also this same exceptional
deference to the federal political branches that proved useful to immigrants
in the Arizona litigation. There, the Court primed its opinion striking down
much of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 by citing foundational plenary power rights
cases and reaffirming the federal government’s broad immigration
authority relative to the states’.242
Moreover, Arizona revealed a further connection between separation
of powers and federalism exceptionalism. Recall that the Court struck
down some of the state provisions based on a putative conflict with the

241

See supra notes 83–85, 174 and accompanying text.
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498–99 (2012); see also Abrams, supra note
237 (arguing that the Court borrowed plenary power principles from foundational immigration law
cases when conducting conflict and field preemption analysis).
242
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Executive’s (rather than Congress’s) immigration enforcement policies.243
Essentially, the Court treated the federal government as an undifferentiated
whole for purposes of its federalism analysis.
By doing so, the Court blurred past latent separation of powers issues
concerning the lawmaking relationship between Congress and the
Executive, which later came to a head in United States v. Texas.244 There,
the constitutional question was whether DAPA violates the Take Care
Clause.245 Yet the government’s petition for certiorari began by announcing
that “[t]he authority to control immigration . . . is vested solely in the
Federal government,” without differentiating between Congress and the
Executive.246 Moreover, the government took that quotation from Truax v.
Raich, an immigration federalism and rights case. Then, only a few
keystrokes later, the government asserted that “[a] principal feature of the
removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration
officials.”247 This quotation, however, was drawn from Arizona, which is
ostensibly a federalism (preemption) case.
These crossover arguments and outcomes pop up repeatedly, and quite
often with no appreciation or fanfare. Here we have shone a spotlight on
this phenomenon; later parts of the discussion will suggest what this
phenomenon entails for immigration theory and advocacy. Although
predicting specific spillovers can be tough, and controlling them even
tougher, the first step is to appreciate that they sometimes happen.248
243

See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (explaining that the state law “could be exercised without any
input from the [Executive] about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case,” thus “allow[ing]
the State to achieve its own immigration policy”); cf. id. at 2521 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[T]o say, as the Court does, that Arizona contradicts federal law by enforcing
applications of the Immigration Act that the President declines to enforce boggles the mind.” (emphasis
removed)). Of course, one might conceive of congressional intent broadly, in a manner that includes
funding and appropriations inherently linked to interpreting the removal standards. On the other hand,
however, Congress’s lack of federal funding does not, of itself, necessarily signal an intent to forbid
states from using their own funds toward immigration enforcement. Cf. Rubenstein, supra note 29, at
132–33.
244
See supra notes 160–66 and accompanying text (discussing separation of powers issues raised
by Texas litigation). See generally Rubenstein, supra note 124 (teasing out the separation of powers
issues embedded within recent immigration federalism debates).
245
See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).
246
See Brief of the United States on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, United States v. Texas,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (No. 15-674) (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
247
Id. at 3 (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499).
248
To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that spillovers always happen. Sometimes the Court
does seem to cabin particular rulings to particular contexts. In INS v. Chadha, for example, the Court
eschewed the plenary power doctrine in a separation of powers context. 462 U.S. 919, 940–44 (1983).
Disappointing expectations, however, the Court continues to apply the plenary power doctrine in rights
and federalism cases. See supra Part II. The absence of any cohering theory for why spillovers
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These spillovers owe to exceptionalism’s interlocking rationales. As
importantly, they are set in motion by jurists, commentators, and advocates
who tap into exceptionalism’s network of supporting rationales. Whether
strategically, unwittingly, or otherwise, “constitutional borrowing”249 of
exceptionalism’s rationales and tropes from one area of constitutional law
into another has at least two potential effects. First, it can serve to reify the
borrowed concept.250 Second, by bridging otherwise discreet doctrines,
borrowing can deliver more coherence to the law.251 In Parts IV and V, we
revisit these potential implications as they pertain to the doctrines of
immigration exceptionalism.
C.

Exceptionalism’s Political Space

The political x-factor is another complicating variable. The capacity of
judicial doctrine to deliver particular societal outcomes is limited. Courts
can set outer boundaries on political action, but cannot dictate the choices
within that space. As a result, what may at first appear as a legal “solution”
to a problem may only be a partial remedy, or none at all, depending on the
political will and policy choices still available to government actors
operating within an exceptional regime.
For instance, the plenary power doctrine is neither a command nor a
limit on federal action. It simply allows the federal political branches to use
their exceptional powers in ways that are mostly immune from judicial
control.252 Likewise, in the first-best scenario for immigrant interests, the
enactment of integrationist subfederal laws and executive nonenforcement
policies are politically contingent. Assuming arguendo that these
immigrant-friendly outcomes are legally permissible, federal and state
officials still must act to operationalize these particular ends.
Indeed, even when the Court forbids certain government action (e.g.,
federal commandeering or discrimination), there is no guarantee that
desired policy outcomes will result. In some instances, exceptional
substitutes to the proscribed government action may be available through
other legitimate means. Insofar as immigration exceptionalism expands the
range of political choice, it also has the capacity to invite, if not also to
justify, these substitutes.
sometimes but not always happen is partly what makes immigration exceptionalism chancy from an
advocacy perspective. We return to this puzzle in Parts IV and V.
249
Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 461–62
(2010). Professors Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai describe the phenomenon of “constitutional
borrowing” as “the practice of importing doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one
area of constitutional law into another for persuasive ends.” Id.
250
See id. at 493–94.
251
See id.
252
See supra Section I.A.
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Of course, political contingency is not unique to immigration; the gap
between doctrine and politics is an indelible feature of society. Our
contributing claim, however, is that exceptionalism discourse can loosen
the law’s grip on politics even further. Against a backdrop of hyperpolitical polarization, this slack must be taken seriously. After all, by its
very nature, political polarization can push immigration policy to the
extremes.253 And, it is at those extremes where immigration exceptionalism
can make all the difference, for better and worse.
An historic example that captures this dynamic is the Haitian
immigrant saga that unfolded in the 1970s and 1980s.254 Immigrant
advocates persuaded courts, under the Due Process Clause, to require
additional procedures for processing Haitian applications for admission.255
The expected outcome was that processing of Haitians would continue but
with greater procedural safeguards that might result in better government
decisions and fewer removals. That occurred to some extent. But instead of
wholly capitulating, the Reagan Administration moved to a policy of
interdicting Haitians on the high seas—outside the reach of the Due
Process Clause and the courts’ rulings. The Executive’s extraordinary
immigration power supported, if not also legitimized, this result.256
To be clear, the lesson from the Haitian interdiction saga, and others
like it, is not that advocates should have remained sidelined in the face of
the government’s deficient procedures. Advocates performed not only
reasonably but also admirably. Moreover, despite the government’s change
in enforcement tactics, the litigation and judicial result may have
established important beachheads for an incremental project of advancing
253

See GULASKEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 31, at ch. 4 (cataloging examples of how
political polarization has influenced federal and subfederal immigration policy).
254
See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1029–32 (5th Cir. 1982) (describing the INS
“Haitian Program” that attempted to streamline and expedite removal of Haitians and denied them the
same procedures that applied to other groups); David E. Ralph, Haitian Interdiction on the High Seas:
The Continuing Saga of the Rights of Aliens Outside United States Territory, 17 MD. J. INT’L L. &
TRADE 227, 232–33 (1993) (describing the history of Haitian migration to the United States during the
repressive regimes in Haiti).
255
See Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37–38 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that inadequate INS
translation services in asylum hearings violated procedural rights); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973,
997 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (“Plaintiffs may not be deprived of their liberty without due process of law and
cannot be denied parole solely because of their race [and] national origin[, or both].”), dismissed in
part, rev’d in part, remanded with instructions sub nom., Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 984 (11th Cir.
1984) (holding that “[e]xcludable aliens cannot challenge the decisions of executive officials with
regard to their applications for admission, asylum, or parole on the basis of the rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution” but that “[t]hey do have rights . . . to whatever process Congress—and
through its regulations and established policies, the Executive branch—have extended them”), remand
aff’d, 472 U.S. 846, 857 (1985).
256
See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187–88 (1993) (upholding the Executive’s
interdiction policy).

633

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

immigrants’ dignity and rights in the long term. The federal Executive’s
domestic practices were disciplined, and perhaps it was forced into a more
difficult, and less effective, type of enforcement.
Still, a disquieting lesson remains. Immediate judicial gains do not
necessarily produce linear outcomes, as they otherwise might in regulatory
fields where one can rely on a steady state of normalized doctrine
applicable to all actors in all situations. In immigration law, judicial
victories can lead to political responses at the same or different levels of
government, which can be difficult to predict ex ante.
* * *
In sum, immigration exceptionalism—as a means to any end—is a
contextually alluring but highly contingent tactic. The possibility of
doctrinal spillovers is a complication that disaggregated treatments of
immigration exceptionalism either miss or have no way to account for.
Meanwhile, the uncertainties of political action, inaction, and reaction, are
often discounted in ways that warrant further attention.
When multiple ends are conjoined, as the first-best scenario
contemplates, the tensions come into sharper image. Again, that scenario
contemplates a set of normative preferences along all three constitutional
dimensions, including: (1) that immigrants have robust rights protection;
(2) that subfederal integrationist laws flourish while their restrictionist foils
abate; and (3) that the federal Executive has power to ease Congress’s
deportation laws.
To be sure, some admixture of political action and mainstream
doctrines might deliver the first-best scenario for immigrant interests. Still,
as a practical matter, politics and mainstream norms will likely come up
short. This is not just our skepticism. Rather, this skepticism surfaces,
inchoately, when scholars and advocates implore the Court to shed
exceptionalism in rights cases, while gesturing to (if not insisting on)
special institutional arrangements for federalism and separation of powers.
Emphatically, our suggestion that scholars and advocates may be
invoking immigration exceptionalism as a mean to an end is not a critique.
After all, immigration is sometimes exceptional. There is no reason why it
cannot, or should not, be exceptional in ways that inure to the benefit of
noncitizens. Missing from the literature, however, is an organizing
metatheory for how to sort exceptional and mainstream doctrines within
and across constitutional dimensions, and to explain why immigration
should be exceptional for some purposes but not for others. The absence of
that coordinating theory poses far greater problems for advocates, theorists,
and jurists than has been recognized to date.
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IV.

AN EXCEPTIONALISM “TRILEMMA”

Building on the foregoing, this Part showcases how immigration
exceptionalism almost certainly requires normative tradeoffs within the
first-best scenario.257 Although the collateral effects of arguing for or
against exceptionalism may not be intended, they may nevertheless be
anticipated. Here, we initiate that project by mapping putative crossdimensional effects using examples culled from actual and foreseeable
cases.
To be clear, similar types of tradeoffs will be necessary even for those
who hold preferences that diverge from those advanced in the first-best
scenario. That stylized scenario, however, provides a good starting
template because it captures the essence of today’s frontline immigration
debates. For commentators and jurists with alternative normative
dispositions, the tradeoffs may be calculated differently. But the doctrinal
and political dynamics feeding those tradeoffs are the same. Conceptually,
the trilemma can be engaged from any of its three ports—rights,
federalism, or separation of powers. But they all wind to the same place: a
smorgasbord of normative choices. In Section IV.A, we start with the rights
preference. In Sections IV.B and IV.C, we reengage the trilemma through
the structural ports of federalism and separation of powers, respectively.
When all is said, theorists, advocates, and jurists may reach the same
doctrine-specific decisions they do now about whether, where, why, and
how immigration should receive special constitutional treatment. Our
hypothesized trilemma, however, offers fresh takes on what those decisions
may entail for the system as a whole.
A.

The Rights Preference

Most immigrant advocates and theorists will surely welcome rights
normalization. In a normalized regime, federal immigration regulation
would be subject to the same judicial scrutiny as other government actions
under the Bill of Rights. But how the rights victory comes, if at all, may be
more important today than in prior times. That is because the mix of
immigrant interests has expanded to include forms of structural
exceptionalism too. Thus, any celebration of success in rights
normalization must also account for potential downsides to immigrant
interests under the Constitution as a whole.
To begin, imagine if the Court decides in the pending case of
Rodriguez v. Robbins that immigration should no longer be treated

257

See supra Part II.
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exceptionally.258 That categorical proclamation, trumpeted in a case
involving due process questions for immigrant detainees, could easily spill
into other rights settings. For instance, it might extend to an equal
protection claim (as in the pending Morales-Santana v. Lynch case259), to
First Amendment challenges, to Second Amendment challenges,260 and so
on. Indeed, if the Court were to declare in any rights case that immigration
is no longer exceptional, it is fair to assume that immigrant advocates and
scholars would be frontline champions of those intra-dimensional
spillovers.
At the same time, however, the sweep of that judicial pronouncement
in one or more rights settings could also extend, inter-dimensionally, to
federalism and separation of powers. After all, if the Court suddenly
declared that immigration is unexceptional, we might reasonably expect the
Court to apply that freshly minted conception to other immigration
contexts, at the urging of advocates or otherwise.
If so, this hypothetical could result in across-the-board immigration
normalization. For instance, Congress could not pass racially
discriminatory laws, applicants for admission to the country would be
entitled to due process, and banning Muslim immigrants would likely be
out of the question. At the same time, however, if the federalism and
separation of powers preferences partly depend on immigration being
exceptional, then a judicial ruling that immigration is never exceptional
could undermine those ends. Thus, the tradeoff.
On first take, many might happily accept this package deal. But, on
further reflection, the calculation becomes more fraught. Rights
normalization alone would not remedy some of the deep and enduring
pathologies of today’s immigration system. Even with rights normalization,
the United States would still have an estimated undocumented population
of more than 11 million,261 an expansive list of removal statutes that would
258

804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) (challenge to the judicial
procedures required by the federal government’s immigration detention policies).
259
804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016) (equal protection challenge
to immigration statute’s facial gender distinctions regarding parental conferral of derivative citizenship
to children).
260
There is a split between the Seventh Circuit and the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits as to
whether the Second Amendment protects unauthorized aliens within U.S. borders. See Maria
Stracqualursi, Note, Undocumented Immigrants Caught in the Crossfire: Resolving the Circuit Split on
“the People” and the Applicable Level of Scrutiny for Second Amendment Challenges, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1447, 1447–49 (2016).
261
See Jen Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts About Immigrants Eligible for Deportation Relief Under
Obama’s Expanded Executive Actions, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 19, 2016), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/19/key-facts-immigrants-obama-action/
[https://perma.cc/
MJ8B-KJ4A] (estimating the total unauthorized immigrant population is 11.2 million based on residual
methodology applied to 2012 American Community Survey).
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withstand constitutional challenge under mainstream standards,262 and
restrictionist states ready and willing to pick up the federal government’s
enforcement slack.263 These are the very problems that federalism and
separation of powers exceptionalism could help mitigate under certain
political conditions, but could not in a regime of across-the-board
normalization. Absent special separation of powers doctrines, for example,
the Executive may be deprived of constitutional authority to grant
categorical reprieves like DAPA and DACA. Meanwhile, absent federalism
exceptionalism, state and local jurisdictions may have greater license to
pursue restrictionist agendas.264
The Texas litigation offers a glimpse of the types of unintended
consequences of rights normalization that we have in mind. To see how
requires rewinding the tape a bit. Prior to the Texas litigation, Arizona
attempted to deny driver’s licenses to the beneficiaries of the Executive’s
DACA program.265 As earlier mentioned, the Ninth Circuit held in the
preliminary injunction phase that the DACA beneficiaries had shown a
likelihood of success on their equal protection claim.266 That decision
appeared to be an unmitigated victory for immigrants, both in its outcome
and the court’s use of a normalized constitutional rights framework to reach
it.267
Harder to anticipate, however, was how that rights ruling in Arizona
would be spun by oppositional forces in Texas to deny deferred action to an
exponentially larger class of potential DAPA beneficiaries. Texas’s

262

See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (inadmissibility); id. §1227 (deportability).
See, e.g., Appellants’ Opening Brief at 1, 12, 23, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th
Cir. 2011) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB) (explaining that Arizona S.B. 1070 was enacted against federal
“non-enforcement of the federal immigration laws” and the Department of Homeland Security’s alleged
“inability (or unwillingness) to enforce the federal immigration laws effectively”).
264
To be sure, DAPA and DACA may not depend on exceptional norms; meanwhile, mainstream
statutory preemption may be sufficient to preempt subfederal restrictionist laws. The point, however, is
that scholars must at least account for the risk that mainstream norms will not fulfill those functions.
See generally supra Part III (elaborating on these points).
265
See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing
Arizona’s policy); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3153(D) (2016) (prohibiting Arizona
Department of Transportation from issuing driver’s licenses to anyone “who does not submit proof
satisfactory to the department that the applicant’s presence in the United States is authorized under
federal law”).
266
See Ariz. Dream Act Coal., 757 F.3d at 1064–65. Thereafter, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision
permanently enjoining Arizona’s driver’s license policy. But, rather than rest its decision on equal
protection grounds, the court decided on preemption grounds. See Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer,
818 F.3d 901, 905–06, 913–17 (9th Cir. 2016); see also supra notes 132–36 and accompanying text
(discussing the court’s alternative dispositions).
267
See, e.g., Fernanda Santos, Court Blocks Arizona Policy of Denying Driver’s Licenses to Some
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/us/08arizona.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/QM2L-YXWG].
263
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primary ground for standing was the putative fiscal cost of having to supply
driver’s licenses to DAPA recipients if the state supplies licenses to other
deferred action recipients.268 Indeed, the district court in the Texas litigation
expressly invoked the Ninth Circuit’s equal protection ruling as a reason
why Texas must supply driver’s licenses to DAPA beneficiaries.269 In short,
a move toward normalization in the rights realm reverberated in federalism
and separation of powers arenas, in ways that may have far greater practical
implications—not only for DAPA, but for state challenges to executive
action more generally.
Again, our point here is not that advocates and scholars should have
refrained from pushing for rights normalization as the basis for victory in
the DACA driver’s license case. Rather, our suggestion is that the
possibility of doctrinal and contextual spillovers could (and perhaps
should) be factored in ex ante. At a minimum, the potential costs (not just
actual costs, and certainly not just the potential benefits) must be accounted
for when assessing any moves toward normalization or exceptionality.
Before proceeding, we pause to acknowledge that the contingencies
hypothesized above might be adjustable if, for example, the Court were to
abrogate rights exceptionalism on more refined and textured reasoning than
posited in our opening salvo. Rather than a categorical declaration that
immigration is unexceptional, perhaps the Court will decide that foreign
affairs, judicial solicitude to the political branches, or national
sovereignty—or some combination of the aforementioned factors—are
dubious reasons to treat immigration exceptionally in constitutional rights
cases.270 We leave open the possibility, revisited in Part V, that more
granular reasoning along these or other lines might change the tenor and
likelihood of doctrinal spillovers.271
Still, despite best efforts to avoid spillovers, they can still happen
owing to exceptionalism’s common-root system of supporting rationales. In
the Chinese Exclusion Cases, for example, the Court infamously invoked
national sovereignty as one basis for the federal government’s plenary
power over immigration.272 Debunking the sovereignty rationale in service
268

See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015).
See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 617–18 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“[I]n the wake of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, it is apparent that the federal
government will compel compliance by all states regarding the issuance of driver’s licenses to
recipients of deferred action.”).
270
See supra notes 169–74 and accompanying text.
271
Indeed, for instrumentally minded advocates, these types of adjustments may be an important
takeaway of this Article. See infra Part V (suggesting how advocates might leverage our insights about
immigration exceptionalism’s common-root system of supporting rationales).
272
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (linking “[t]he power of exclusion
of foreigners” to the “sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States”); see also Kerry
269
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of the rights preference would seemingly tame immigration’s extraconstitutional status and thus allow for normal judicial review when
constitutional rights are implicated.273 But doing so might also cascade into
federalism. After all, thick notions of national sovereignty are potential
antidotes to thick notions of state sovereignty. Thus, relaxing the former
might have implications for the latter.274 Indeed, both restrictionist and
integrationist subfederal jurisdictions have rallied behind robust
conceptions of state sovereignty to defend their immigration-related
preferences.275 Moreover, Texas relied on its sovereign status as a reason to
support Article III standing to challenge DAPA, including on separation of
powers grounds.276 Now, states are doing the same in their legal challenges
to President Trump’s immigration ban.277
Again, it is not our purpose to make predictions here. Our aim is
simply to bring new attention to the possibilities. Advocates and theorists
may get a little more, or a little less, than they ask of courts. That slack is
not unique to immigration. But, when dealing in the currency of
exceptional government power, the effects can be vastly magnified.
B.

The Federalism Preference

Turning to the federalism dimension reveals similar tensions and
accommodations. As explained in Parts I and II, there are several
immigration federalism doctrines advanced and supported in the literature
today, which to greater and lesser extents, may all be up for grabs in the

Abrams, supra note 237, at 617–18 (observing that “plenary power and structural immigration
preemption are distinct concepts,” but that “early cases articulating the two doctrines drew on the same
logic”).
273
See supra Section IV.A.
274
To be clear, these sovereignties are different. In the federalism context, however, they are
relativistic. Thus, the meaning and scope of national sovereignty can have implications for state
sovereignty, and vice versa.
275
See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511–12 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As
a sovereign, Arizona has the inherent power to exclude persons from its territory, subject only to those
limitations expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed by Congress.”); see also Bill Ong
Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good
Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 296, 309 (2012) (providing constitutional defense of state
and local sanctuary policies); Markowitz, supra note 97 (explaining and defending the legality of the
proposed state citizenship bill on sovereignty grounds); Brief of Respondent Texas in Opposition at 17–
19, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2015) (No. 15-674) (arguing that Texas should be granted
standing based on its sovereign status).
276
See Brief of Respondent Texas in Opposition, supra note 275, at 17–19.
277
See Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 655437 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2017) (holding
that Washington and Minnesota have standing); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief,
Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017); see also supra notes 5–6
(original and revised immigration bans).
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Court. We now revisit those immigration federalism doctrines, recast
through our trilemma.
1. The Exclusivity Principle.—To begin, a robust exclusivity
doctrine can help deliver part of the first-best scenario’s federalism
preference—namely, the part that squeezes restrictionist state and local
laws from the national landscape. Recall that the Court has limited the
exclusivity principle to regulations governing the admission and expulsion
of noncitizens (i.e., immigration regulation).278 Some theorists, advocates,
and lower court jurists have approached this doctrine functionally, such that
restrictionist regulations that make life more difficult for undocumented
immigrants, or indirectly affect migration decisions, are treated as
immigration regulation.279
For immigrant advocates, the appeal of this functionalist approach is
the ends it delivers. But the rationale behind the functional approach could
be extended further to sweep immigration-friendly policies into the
preemption vortex. After all, if indirect restrictionist pushes from a state or
city are enough to trigger the exclusivity principle, why don’t integrationist
pulls of immigrants into a state also trigger preemption? In theory, at least,
if immigrants are mobile enough to exit from a jurisdiction where life is
made hard for them or their families, immigrants may be mobile enough to
enter a jurisdiction where life can be better. Empirically, perhaps that is not
the case. But we are aware of no studies that demonstrate the difference.
Although it is not clear how these tensions might be resolved, a robust
exclusivity principle surely opens the possibility of this intra-dimensional
tradeoff—namely, structural preemption of restrictionist and integrationist
subfederal laws.280

278

As explained earlier, preemption via the exclusivity principle is said to derive from the
constitutional structure; thus, the existence (or not) of a conflict with federal law is theoretically
irrelevant. See supra Section II.B.1. Instead, what matters is whether the subfederal law qualifies as a
“regulation of immigration.” See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353, 363–65 (1976); Rubenstein,
supra note 29, at 118–31 (distinguishing structural preemption, statutory preemption, and
administrative preemption).
279
See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 563 U.S. 1030
(2011) (“We recognize, of course, that Hazleton’s housing provisions neither control actual physical
entry into the City, nor physically expel persons from it. Nonetheless, [i]n essence, that is precisely
what they attempt to do.” (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra Sections I.B.1, II.B.1.
280
See Erin F. Delaney, Note, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce Clause
Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1834, 1839–40 (2007)
(“[P]reemption analysis, even assuming that it is effectively and predictably applied, might actually
undermine pro-immigrant reform efforts.”); cf. Rodríguez, supra note 194, at 609 (“[I]ntegration
measures sometimes resemble immigration controls. This overlap is given little thought in a world of
federal exclusivity, but the success of immigrant integration depends on it.”).
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Moreover, inter-dimensionally, it is worth recalling here that the
exclusivity principle is historically linked to the plenary power doctrine in
rights cases. Thus, reifying the exclusivity principle may also indirectly
reify rights exceptionalism. Immigrant advocates surely do not intend that.
But government lawyers might.281
2. Executive Preemption via Nonbinding Policy.—Like the federal
exclusivity principle, executive preemption via nonbinding policies is not a
one-way ratchet. On the one hand, this exceptional doctrine has the
potential to advance the federalism, rights, and separation of powers
preferences simultaneously. For example, executive preemption can quash
restrictionist subfederal laws (thus boosting the federalism preference).
Meanwhile, executive preemption can root out race-based subfederal
immigration enforcement (advancing the rights preference), and perform
better in that regard than congressional statutes (thus furthering the
separation of powers preference). Moreover, executive preemption can do
useful work that the exclusivity principle cannot. Whereas the exclusivity
principle operates only on subfederal immigration regulations, executive
preemption can displace restrictionist alienage regulations (i.e., those that
pertain to noncitizens but that do not qualify as regulations of admission or
removal).282
On the other hand, however, executive preemption via nonbinding
executive policy might upset the federalism, separation of powers, and
rights preferences as well.283 For instance, a sufficiently motivated
Executive might unilaterally craft rights-depriving programs, and preempt
integrationist state laws that try to intercede. Under this skeptical scenario,
trending integrationist measures like California’s TRUST Act, local
sanctuary laws throughout the country, and New York’s contemplated state
citizenship bill may become the next targets of executive preemption.284

281

See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 7, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13-1402) (the
government linking federal exclusivity to consular nonreviewability).
282
See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text (explaining the Court’s dichotomous treatment
of immigration versus alienage regulations, and how the line between breaks down in theory and
practice).
283
See Rubenstein, supra note 124 (elaborating on these points).
284
See California Trust Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282 (West 2014); Brief for the Center on the
Administration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee-Plaintiff at 23, United States v.
Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16645) (stating that at least seventy-three cities,
counties, and states have at various times had “non-cooperation” provisions); Hing, supra note 275, at
296, 309 (discussing sanctuary laws and defending them on constitutional and normative grounds);
Markowitz, supra note 97, at 905–10 (same for New York’s contemplated state citizenship law);
Rosenbaum, supra note 208, at 504–14, 522–25 (same for California TRUST Act). Moreover, although
the Obama Administration’s rollout of the Secure Communities program may not have been motivated
to shut down subfederal sanctuary and non-cooperation laws, it had that effect throughout many
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Indeed, President Trump’s executive order on interior enforcement
makes it clear that his Administration intends to crack down on local
jurisdictions that interfere with federal enforcement efforts.285 In addition,
he has directed DHS to enter into as many § 287(g) agreements286 as
possible with willing local agencies and municipalities.287 In opposition, the
California legislature is currently considering a “state sanctuary” bill,
which includes a provision barring localities in the state from entering into
section § 287(g) agreements.288 If the state law passes, could the executive
order and its implementing guidance preempt it?
To be clear, we take no position here on whether these and other
integrationist initiatives can survive preemption challenges under existing
federal statutes and mainstream federalism doctrines. For present purposes,
the point is that a robust executive-preemption doctrine opens a new legal
front: federal administrators’ interference with subfederal integrationist
policies.289 Certainly, there is no shortage of legal or political reasons that a
sufficiently motivated administration might offer for doing so. Just to name
a few, administrators might claim that state or local integration programs
interfere with a federal statute,290 interfere with (new) enforcement
priorities, unduly incentivize unlawful migration to the country, create
untoward races-to-the-top (or bottom) among the states for human

jurisdictions. See Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 158, at 137 (“Secure Communities promised to
displace the unpredictable human element of formal and informal cooperation with local police.”).
285
Exec. Order 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017) (detailing, in § 9, an intent to have
the DOJ and DHS impose financial penalties on “sanctuary jurisdictions”).
286
See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (authorizing the federal government to enter into agreements
with state and local agencies to seek state and local aid in immigration enforcement).
287
Exec. Order 13,768, § 8 (detailing that it is the “policy of the executive branch to empower
State and local law enforcement agencies . . . to perform the functions of an immigration officer”
through the use of 287(g) agreements); see also Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t. of
Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20,
2017) (detailing implementation policies for “[e]xpansion of the 287(g) [p]rogram in the [b]order
[r]egion”).
288
S.B. 54, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). This proposed state law, and specifically
§ 7284.6(a)(H), would prohibit state law enforcement agencies from “[p]erforming the functions of an
immigration officer, whether pursuant to [§ 287(g)] . . . or any other law, regulation, or policy, whether
formal or informal.”
289
See Rubenstein, supra note 124, at 1004–05.
290
See, e.g., Application and Proposed Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States of America at 2,
In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014) (No. S202512) [hereinafter Garcia Amicus Brief] (arguing that
California had no authority under then-extant law to admit an undocumented immigrant to the state
bar).
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capital,291 or reduce incentives for undocumented immigrants to voluntarily
depart.292
Indeed, even the Obama Administration—which introduced DACA
and DAPA—intervened to challenge certain state integrationist policies.
For example, when Illinois tried to limit the use of the federal E-Verify
system to check employment authorization, the Administration successfully
sued to preempt that state law.293 And, when the California Supreme Court
was considering whether to admit an undocumented immigrant as a lawyer
to the state bar, the Obama Administration filed an amicus brief arguing
that the state court could not do so under existing federal law.294
To be sure, political forces might temper executive preemption of
subfederal integrationist laws, particularly with the rising power and
prominence of Latino voters.295 But politics is not a limiting principle that
theorists should necessarily rush to, especially if it is the only limiting
principle. Politics has not prevented past administrations from taking
hardnosed (not to mention, rights-depriving) actions against immigrants.296

291

Cf. Rodríguez, supra note 194, at 588 (discussing a report in Iowa that called for “immigrant
recruitment to reenergize the state’s population, characterizing immigrants as productive, motivated,
eager to work, and entrepreneurial”).
292
See Rubenstein, supra note 124, at 1005–06.
293
See United States v. Illinois, No. 07-3261, 2009 WL 662703, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2009).
294
See Garcia Amicus Brief, supra note 290, at 2. Subsequent to oral argument at the California
Supreme Court, the California legislature passed a law providing bar licenses for undocumented
applicants, thus obviating the specific objection of the federal government. See CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 30 (West 2014).
295
This may be especially true as the Latino electorate becomes a critical voting bloc for winning
presidential primaries and general elections. Mark Hugo Lopez & Paul Taylor, Latino Voters in the
2012 Election, PEW HISP. CTR. REP. (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/07/latinovoters-in-the-2012-election/ [https://perma.cc/ZNN6-YTWU]; Lizette Ocampo, Top 6 Facts on the
Latino Vote, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 17, 2015, 9:04 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/immigration/news/2015/09/17/121325/top-6-facts-on-the-latino-vote/ [https://perma.cc/AT4L9D7E]. Even so, however, it assumes that Latino voting preferences on immigration will remain static
and predictable. This may not be so. For example, in California, it has been true for a little more than
two decades that Latinos vote mainly Democratic and care deeply about immigration issues. However,
prior to Pete Wilson’s embrace of Proposition 187, Latino voting in California was much less
predictable and up for grabs. See Cathleen Decker, ‘90’s Immigration Battle Remade California’s
Political Landscape, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-polcalifornia-politics-20141123-story.html [https://perma.cc/6H2A-CF4M].
296
See Johnson, supra note 208, at 635–36 (noting, among other episodes, “the repatriation of
persons of Mexican ancestry . . . during the Great Depression, deportations of communist party
members during the McCarthy era, exploitation of Mexican workers through the Bracero Program, the
mass arrests, detentions, and removals of Muslim and Arab noncitizens after the attacks on September
11, 2001, and the raids, detention, and removal of noncitizens in contemporary times” (footnotes and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Quite often, anti-immigrant politics is to blame for these incursions, and it
will be the cause of future ones.297
Moreover, administrative notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
could offer some inertial resistance against executive preemption. By law,
those procedures open administrative decisions to a plurality of viewpoints
(including by states and subfederal officials), requiring the agency to take
competing viewpoints into consideration and to justify any final decisions
made.298 But, as discussed above, these administrative procedures are not
prerequisites to the preemption doctrine under consideration.299 Indeed, that
is partly what makes preemption via nonbinding executive policies so
exceptional and its backing by immigrant advocates so chancy.
Thus far, what has saved some integrationist measures from challenge
is the general difficulty of establishing standing to sue.300 But the Texas

297

Consider the Obama Administration’s raids to find and remove Central American immigrants,
many of whom may have legitimate claims to asylum and are arguably not receiving fair treatment. For
a recent report, see Jerry Markon and David Nakamura, Tensions Escalate Further Between Obama,
Democrats over Deportation Raids, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/federal-eye/wp/2016/01/12/tensions-escalate-further-between-obama-democrats-over-deportationraids/ [https://perma.cc/M8AR-VKBN].
298
As applied by the Court, the APA’s notice-and-comment procedure is demanding (though, to be
sure, less demanding than the legislative process). First, the agency must provide advance notice of its
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and offer interested parties the opportunity to submit
written comments in response. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012). Moreover, to enable meaningful
public comments, courts have required the agency to make its intentions clearly known in the notice of
rulemaking. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 2002). Further,
because courts require that an agency’s final rule be a “logical outgrowth” of what the notice
foreshadowed, the agency may not change an important aspect of a proposed rule without first
providing an additional notice and opportunity for public comment. See, e.g., Phillip M. Kannan, The
Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 214 (1996) (“Generally stated, if
the final rule is found by the reviewing court to be the logical outgrowth of the proposed rule, it will
find adequate notice . . . .”). Finally, although the APA textually requires that a final regulation be
accompanied by a “concise general statement of [the regulation’s] basis and purpose,” § 553(c), courts
generally require the agency to respond to all significant comments received, which burdens the agency
to explain its decisions rather thoroughly. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (discussing that hard look review requires an
agency to articulate the reasoning behind its decision and the court must review the reasoning); Thomas
J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 761
(2008) (providing that hard look doctrine requires agencies “to offer detailed, even encyclopedic,
explanations” for agency actions); see also Hickman, supra note 122, at 474 (explaining that, despite
the text of § 553(c), that judicial requirements for explanation “[e]schew[] concision”). Apart from the
foregoing, notice-and-comment rulemakings potentially trigger political and judicial oversight. See
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments
of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 244, 258 (1987).
299
See supra notes 123–27, 199–205 and accompanying text.
300
See, e.g., Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that Maricopa County,
Arizona Sheriff, Joe Arpaio, lacked standing to challenge DAPA); Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d
1022, 1033–34 (D. Kan. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Kansas’s in-state
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litigation challenging DAPA may widen or open new paths to state
standing. The district court and the Fifth Circuit held that Texas had met its
burden in this regard, and the Supreme Court evenly split on the issue.301 In
any event, standing requirements will not prevent the federal government
from suing to shut down state laws—whether restrictionist (as the Obama
Administration did in Arizona) or integrationist (as it did in Illinois)—or
simply weighing in as amicus (as it did in California).
Ironically, the best defense for subfederal jurisdictions against robust
executive power may be mainstream constitutional federalism norms, such
as the anti-commandeering doctrine.302 Taken at face value, the anticommandeering doctrine forbids the Executive to compel state or local
action. For instance, in the immigration context, the Executive would be
prohibited from compelling subfederal lawmaking bodies to pass
restrictionist immigration measures, compelling subfederal officers to share
immigration-related information with federal authorities, or compelling
subfederal officers to detain removable immigrants on the federal
government’s behalf. Indeed, the anti-commandeering principle and related
state sovereignty rationales play leading roles in the scholarship defending
subfederal sanctuary policies and, more recently, state citizenship.303
But here again is the rub: as of yet, there is no judicially recognized
theory that explains why certain federalism doctrines, but not others,
should be relaxed for immigration. Indeed, the reasons for treating
immigration federalism exceptionally could be marshaled in favor of an
immigration law carve out from the anti-commandeering doctrine. The
Court’s forefront (or at least formal) reasons for the anti-commandeering
doctrine are rooted in thick notions of state sovereignty.304 Yet, if that

tuition law for undocumented immigrants). But cf. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 162–63 (5th
Cir. 2015) (holding that the state of Texas had standing to challenge DAPA).
301
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam); Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d 134, 151–63 (5th Cir. 2015); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 591, 616–44 (W.D.
Tex. 2015); cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (noting that states receive “special
solicitude” in the standing analysis). Although the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in Texas did
not expressly provide the bases for its split, the four Justices upholding the lower court’s preliminary
injunction could only have reached that result if they also found that Texas demonstrated the threshold
requirement of Article III standing. Conversely, the four votes that would have overturned the lower
court might have done so either on standing grounds, on the merits, or both.
302
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926–28 (1997) (holding that the federal government
cannot commandeer subfederal officers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992)
(holding that the federal government cannot commandeer state legislatures).
303
See generally Hing, supra note 275 (relying on strong conceptions of state autonomy and
sovereign authority to defend positions on sanctuary laws); Markowitz, supra note 97 (same as to state
citizenship proposals, which include and extend beyond sanctuary policies).
304
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (explaining that federal commandeering of state officials is
“fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty”); see also New York,
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sovereignty is porous enough to allow preemption via nonbinding
executive policies, perhaps it is also porous enough to allow
commandeering.
We are not suggesting that the anti-commandeering norm will or
should be relaxed for immigration; just that the logic of exceptional
immigration preemption authority leaves open the possibility. Lest it be
forgotten, the federal government historically commandeered state courts in
immigration. The Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering holding in Printz
v. United States distinguished that immigration precedent but did not
expressly disavow it.305
3. Equal Pro-Emption.—Like the exclusivity principle and executive
preemption, the proposed doctrine of Equal Pro-Emption carries a set of
potential costs and benefits. Preliminarily, judicial buy-in to this
exceptional doctrine may not be forthcoming. Equal Pro-Emption must
overcome a trifecta of rights, federalism, and separation of powers
jurisprudence of the Court’s own creation.306 The concern expressed here is
not with the merits of Equal Pro-Emption. Instead, the concern that we flag
is the immigration federalism regime that might emerge if Equal ProEmption is eschewed by the Court, while other exceptional preemption
doctrines are ushered in.307 Put otherwise, an immigration federalism
package that includes robust federal exclusivity and executive preemption
doctrines (without Equal Pro-Emption) might be worse on the whole than a
federalism regime with no exceptional preemption doctrines.
Apart from these intra-dimensional considerations, Equal ProEmption’s hybrid composition of federalism and rights norms cries out for
an inter-dimensional assessment. On the one hand, Equal Pro-Emption—if
adopted by the Court—could serve to preempt restrictionist subfederal
laws, thus potentially vindicating constitutional rights indirectly. Moreover,
it is often more palatable for courts to rule on preemption grounds than on

505 U.S. at 177 (striking down federal law directing state legislatures to pass laws consistent with
federal standards).
305
521 U.S. at 905–07 (“These early laws establish, at most, that the Constitution was originally
understood to permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar
as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial power.”); see also id. at 949
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for discounting this historical precedent). Indeed, for
the initial period of federal control over immigration (from 1882 to 1891) the federal government relied
on existing state institutions and officials to execute its policies. This remained true until the federal
government created its own administrative apparatus. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra
note 31, at 26–27.
306
See Rubenstein, supra note 29, at 107–12.
307
See id.

646

111:583 (2017)

Immigration Exceptionalism

constitutional rights grounds, as the latter requires courts to find that
facially neutral laws are, indeed, purposefully discriminatory.308
On the other hand, however, what makes Equal Pro-Emption
potentially problematic are these appealing qualities. To begin with,
vindicating rights via preemption carries ancillary opportunity costs. In
cases where Equal Pro-Emption might apply (namely, to challenge
subfederal restrictionist laws), a more direct rights challenge will almost
always be available.309 Yet, when courts choose to directly rule only on
preemption grounds, which is common,310 then important questions about
rights may go unanswered, or worse, simply shrugged away.311
The Arizona litigation, itself, offers a striking example. There, the
federal government challenged Arizona’s laws only on preemption
grounds. And when pressed by Chief Justice Roberts during the opening
moments of oral argument, the U.S. Solicitor General conceded that the
federal government’s challenge did not rely on claims of racial or ethnic

308

See, e.g., Fan, supra note 208, at 940–42. That said, the initial hurdle of expressly adopting
Equal Pro-Emption, in the first instance, will require the Court to explain why it is appropriate to shift
the burden to states to disprove discriminatory intent. Cf. Rubenstein, supra note 124, at 1006–07
(explaining the institutional and doctrinal hurdles that make this unlikely from a conservative Court).
Paradoxically, crafting the doctrine, in the first place, will require the very judicial hubris that the
doctrine is designed to avoid in downstream applications. That is, before applying a judicially
countenanced Equal Pro-Emption doctrine, the Court must first explain why shifting the burden to
states to disprove discrimination is doctrinally appropriate. Perhaps for that reason, Equal Pro-Emption
might do better as an inchoate doctrine. If lower courts are already receptive to employing an equality
norm sub silencio, the best strategy for immigrant advocates may be to wink at the courts but without
making it too obvious.
309
Thus, in such cases, reviewing courts might choose to rule on preemption grounds, rights
grounds, or both. The Supreme Court, for its part, has run the gamut. In Toll v. Moreno, a case
challenging a state-alienage classification, the Court sidestepped the equal protection question, and
decided the case on the basis of preemption. 458 U.S. 1, 11 n.16 (1982). In Plyler v. Doe, the Court
ruled on equal protection grounds, and expressly declined to rule on preemption grounds. 457 U.S. 202,
224–26 (1982). And, in Graham v. Richardson, the Court ruled on both equal protection and
preemption grounds. 403 U.S. 365, 375–76, 382 (1971). It bears noting, however, that Graham ruled
that equal protection and preemption were each independent grounds for striking down the state law at
issue. Id. By contrast, the Equal Pro-Emption theory infuses preemption with equality norms, but does
not entail or require a finding that an equal protection violation has in fact occurred. See supra notes
128–41 and accompanying text.
310
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 206 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011);
Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 765–67, 769 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 991–1007 (D. Ariz. 2010); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 851–59 (N.D. Tex. 2010); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 858, 866–75 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d
1043, 1056–57 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
311
Johnson, supra note 208, at 612 (observing that judicial reliance on preemption theories to
analyze subfederal restrictionist laws “often fails to directly address the civil rights impacts on minority
communities”); see also Fan, supra note 208, at 932–38.
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profiling.312 Later, in upholding Section 2(B) against the government’s
facial preemption challenge, the Court declined to presume that a state law
would be interpreted by the state court in a way that would lead to
constitutional violations against immigrants or people of color.313
Of course, the result in any particular case may be the same regardless
of whether the reviewing court rules on preemption or rights grounds.
Namely, the subfederal law at issue may be invalidated. Yet there is an
important difference: preemption vindicates notions of federal primacy; it
does not directly vindicate individual rights per se.314 For some, that
difference matters.315
In important respects, the subfederal immigration revolution of the
past decade has presented an opportunity to rethink constitutional rights—
not just in immigration, but also more generally. When courts and
advocates rely on preemption theories as a crutch, it detracts and distracts
from what arguably matters more: advancing rights qua rights. Of course,
that is not to deny the relevance or importance of structural concerns. But,
the fact that immigrant advocates and theorists tend to focus mostly on
subfederal restrictionist laws, and not integrationist ones, strongly indicates
that discrimination (not federalism) is the driving concern.
More generally, Equal Pro-Emption is a concession that immigration
law can be exceptional. That could pose problems—now or later—for those
claiming that immigration should not be exceptional. Meanwhile, for those
who believe that immigration can or should be exceptional for some
312

To the consternation of many immigrant advocates, the federal government challenged S.B.
1070 only on preemption grounds (presumably because challenging the state’s restrictionist laws on
equal protection grounds would have been more difficult, both legally and politically). Cf. Fan, supra
note 208, at 938 (“Antidiscrimination norms did not expressly enter the district court’s analysis, though
the court was quite cognizant of the concerns and they arguably influenced its preemption analysis.”
(footnote omitted)). In a telling exchange during the opening moments of oral argument, Chief Justice
Roberts interrupted Solicitor General Donald Verrilli to inquire: “Before you get into what the case is
about, I’d like to clear up at the outset what it’s not about. No part of your argument has to do with
racial or ethnic profiling, does it?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182). The Solicitor General relented, responding: “That’s correct.” Id. And
when the issue of race surfaced only minutes later in the Solicitor General’s comments, Justice Scalia
was quick to remind the Solicitor General of his earlier commitment to what the case was not about. Id.
at 47.
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Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509–10.
314
Bosniak, supra note 69, at 1107 (suggesting that federalism and the Supremacy Clause concern
“institutional process” or “who decides” and not who are the “the rightful subjects of equality”).
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Harold Koh, for example, long ago lamented the inadequacies of preemption as a substitute for
equal protection in cases involving discrimination against noncitizens. See Harold Hongju Koh,
Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV.
51, 97–98 (1985). Moreover, as Professor Mary Fan explains, a danger of using preemption as a proxy
for vindicating rights is that it may allow racialized sentiments “to fester wholly unaired” and
“embolden[] the angry and anxious to enact intensifying and multifarious vehicles of venting ire at the
expense of out-groups.” Fan, supra note 208, at 942.
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purposes (even if not for others), there might still be reason for pause.
Equal Pro-Emption muddles the boundaries between rights and federalism.
In other settings, that can lead to federalism–rights spillovers that inure to
the detriment of immigrant interests.316
C.

Separation of Powers Preference

Finally, turning to separation of powers, some scholars and advocates
support the notion that the Executive has (or should have) exceptional
leeway to pursue immigration policies.317 How the Court rules on that issue
can have implications beyond separation of powers.
Consider the impact on the rights preference if the Court embraces an
inherency or functional theory of executive power. If rights exceptionalism
remains, then in future cases the Executive could use its power in rightsdegrading ways.318 For instance, the Executive could—as it did post-9/11—
create enforcement or immigration-gathering programs that target
immigrants of certain nationalities.319 On an inherency rationale, the
Executive might take even more pernicious action, without any need for
express congressional authorization, and even despite statutory
prohibitions.
If the retort is that immigrant interests, however defined, are in
comparatively better hands with the Executive than in other government
institutions, then much would seem to depend on who the President is.
Under conditions where relevant political majorities and the White House
are decidedly anti-immigrant, we can forget about the best-case scenario
for immigrant interests and turn to worst-case scenarios. Indeed, those
scenarios may be dawning under President Trump.
316

Professor Condon’s recent study, which suggests that lower courts are increasingly consulting
federal policies as a benchmark to gauge rights challenges to subfederal policies, may be a cautionary
example. See Condon, supra note 82.
317
See supra Section II.C.
318
Cf. Margulies, supra note 159 (arguing that DAPA is ultra vires and cautioning that the program
sets a dangerous political precedent); see also William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait:
Evaluating the Obama Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action,
2014 UTAH L. REV. 773, 775 (“Presidential power has already expanded dramatically since the middle
part of the twentieth century . . . . In light of this reality, investing the presidency with even more
powers is problematic no matter what the circumstances.”).
319
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Justice rolled out the
“special registration” program of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”).
Registration of Certain Nonimmigrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 67,766 (Nov. 6,
2002). This program required thousands of young men from predominantly Muslim countries to report
to local immigration offices for interrogations, fingerprints, and photographs, and withstood
constitutional and administrative law challenges. See, e.g., Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 73–74
(1st Cir. 2006); Hadayat v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 2006); Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d
433, 439–40 (5th Cir. 2006); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 681 n.4 (5th Cir. 2006); Zafar v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Depending on perspective, these concerns may be partly allayed, or
intensified, under the dynamic lawmaking models recently advanced by
Cox and Rodríguez (writing together) and Motomura. They offer rule of
law norms as a limiting principle.320 Even then, however, the conditions for
legitimate executive lawmaking under their models might be satisfied if the
executive policy is transparent and reduces arbitrary enforcement relative
to the system it replaces. So, for instance, if a President announces from the
Rose Garden that Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials should
consistently exclude Muslim immigrants, and offers arguably rational
reasons for doing so, that might satisfy the rule of law values touted by
supporters of DAPA/DACA.321 And, insofar as the rule of law ideal is not a
judicially
enforceable
standard—which
Cox
and
Rodríguez
acknowledge322—it is not clear that the rule of law is a limiting principle at
all, beyond self-regulation in the political sphere.323
Beyond upsetting the rights preference, an exceptional executive
authority can also undermine the federalism preference, for reasons that we
have already previewed.324 Under mainstream federalism doctrine, only
valid federal laws can preempt state and local laws. But if the Executive
has inherent or dynamic lawmaking authority, then that could vastly
expand the class and types of federal law that can preempt subfederal laws.
Nothing we have said denies the potential good that may come from
special separation of powers doctrines and arrangements. Foremost, the
Executive might use its enhanced power in ways that ease Congress’s harsh
deportation laws in nonarbitrary ways (furthering the separation of powers
preference), do so in rights-regarding ways (consistent with the rights
preference), and promote state and local integration of immigrants (per the
320

Hiroshi Motomura, The President’s Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement, and the Rule
of Law in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 26–27 (2016) (arguing that rule of law norms are a
reason why (1) the plenary power should be abrogated, (2) top-down categorical enforcement policies
within the Executive Branch—in particular, DACA and DAPA—are lawful, and (3) subfederal
restrictionist laws should be preempted); see also Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 158, at 192–93;
MOTOMURA, supra note 24, 204–05.
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Cf. Rubenstein, supra note 124, at 1002 (flagging this concern). The rule of law, of course, is a
highly contested and complicated collection of norms. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Toward a Practical
Definition of the Rule of Law, JUDGES J., Fall 2007, at 4 (“Few concepts in law are more basic than the
rule of law, few are more frequently invoked, and yet few are more imprecisely defined.”). However,
under most conceptions, judicial review is a core ingredient. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 216–17 (1969). For a useful typology of the “thick” and “thin” gradients of the rule of law, see
BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY ch. 7 (2004).
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Cox & Rodríguez, Redux, supra note 158, at 210–14.
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Cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011) (arguing that the modern presidency is unconstrained by law); Richard
H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1410–13 (2012) (reviewing and critiquing
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See supra notes 288–93 and accompanying text.
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federalism preference). But there are less idyllic scenarios, which deserve
greater airtime in debates about immigration exceptionalism.
* * *
Our stylized trilemma does not advocate for suboptimal scenarios, or,
indeed, for any set of tradeoffs that might ensue. Rather, it brings the
potential costs and benefits to the same ledger. Due to immigration
exceptionalism’s common-root system of putative rationales, reasons
offered in favor or against exceptionalism in one doctrinal context may
spill into others. Normative accommodations, whether and however made,
will almost certainly be necessary.
We leave open the possibility that a mix of exceptional structural
doctrines may deliver a second-best regime, given that rights normalization
may not be in the cards. We also fully appreciate that, under certain
political conditions, the structural immigration doctrines up for grabs may
bode well for undocumented immigrants. Because this population is
generally removable by federal statute,325 undocumented immigrants stand
to benefit from the combined effects of a gridlocked Congress, an
Executive Branch that deprioritizes enforcement against certain categories
of potentially removable immigrants, and a robust preemption doctrine that
prevents state and local governments from filling the enforcement gap.
Still, as a means to these and related ends, federalism and separation of
powers exceptionalism come with a major limitation: any promise they
hold is politically contingent.
V.

A NEW FOUNDATION FOR IMMIGRATION THEORY

This Article calls for a shift in how theorists, advocates, and jurists
engage questions about immigration exceptionalism moving forward.
Context-specific treatments are important but inherently limited precisely
because they do not account for the dynamism between constitutional
contexts. Our suggested reframing spans across myriad constitutional
dimensions to capture how the Court’s various doctrines interact with each
other and with politics in ways that impact the whole system.
The latent tradeoffs in this integrated system can only be appreciated
by expanding the frame to look. This Article’s purpose has been to scaffold
a new infrastructure to capture those tradeoffs in the first place. From this
new starting position, future thinking might move in any number of
directions. In what follows, we offer some preliminary thoughts to advance
those projects, all of which are related.
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See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 1227(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
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First, the possibility of doctrinal spillovers means that immigration
exceptionalism will almost certainly require normative tradeoffs. Theorists
and advocates should account for this prior to backing exceptional
arrangements or doctrines. Immigration constitutional doctrine tends to be
sticky—in ways often unfavorable to immigrant interests and difficult to
undo.326
A nagging question is how to account for the political and doctrinal
dynamics of immigration exceptionalism. On the issue of constitutional
rights, scholars heavily discount the federal government’s ability to selfregulate its mostly unchecked plenary power. And for good reason:
throughout history, the federal government has demonstrated its propensity
to use its immigration power in disquieting, if not abhorrent ways. Yet the
calculation appears remarkably different when the conversation turns to
federalism and separation of powers. As to these structural arrangements,
some scholars put significant faith (or perhaps hope) in the federal
government’s capacity or incentive to self-regulate its broad power. For
now, we pass no judgment on these tactics and strategies. However, we
emphasize that if consequences matter, then appreciation for the doctrinal
and political dynamics limned in this Article is essential to any fair
calculation. If nothing else, the doctrinal and political dynamics attending
immigration exceptionalism counsel for pragmatic skepticism about
whether and how to summon immigration’s special qualities. Doctrines that
may look good under certain conditions may be dubious in other political
contexts.
Second, the tradeoffs inhering in an integrated regime of
exceptionalism may be adjustable and contingent, depending on how
exceptionalism’s root system of supporting rationales is tapped. Though
empirically untested, we hypothesize that the likelihood of doctrinal
spillovers into adjacent doctrinal contexts may increase as the breadth of
the exceptionalism rationale expands. Conversely, as the rationale for or
against exceptionalism contracts, the likelihood of doctrinal spillovers may
correspondingly abate. If so, scholars and advocates seeking to vindicate
justice and opportunity for immigrants might try to leverage this insight
when pressing for the right mix of doctrinal spillovers.
Third, scholars and advocates may also consider ways to theorize
around the conventional rationales of immigration exceptionalism. If so,
326

Cf. Victor C. Romero, Devolution and Discrimination, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. AM. L. 377, 378 (2002)
(“Despite calls among many to dismantle it, Congress’s plenary power over immigration, and the
Executive’s concomitant authority to enforce it, are likely here to stay . . . .” (footnote omitted)). See
generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change
in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605 (2001) (“[C]ourts’ early resolutions of legal
issues can become locked-in and resistant to change.”).

652

111:583 (2017)

Immigration Exceptionalism

then perhaps the doctrinal dynamics treated here can be replaced or
complemented with others. Cox and Rodríguez’s “two-principals” model of
congressional–executive policymaking may be an example or attempt at
this.327 Essentially, by grounding their arguments in the structure of the INA
and its vast delegations (including “de facto delegation”),328 they attempt to
distance their two-principals model from more conventional exceptionalism
rationales.
However, even assuming that Cox and Rodríguez’s approach frees
initiatives like DAPA/DACA from exceptionalism’s grip, the sorts of
cross-dimensional questions showcased here would still persist. For
instance, how would (or should) their dynamic separation of powers model
interface with Rodríguez’s functional model of immigration federalism?
On the one hand, their separation of powers account puts a premium on
energized and efficient executive power. On the other hand, Rodríguez’s
federalism model contemplates a more robust state role in immigration,
including a relaxed federal preemption doctrine.329 Considered together, do
nonbinding enforcement policies have preemptive effect if states try to
resist? Those types of bundled questions will still need answers, even when
attempting to escape the trappings of exceptionalism.
Fourth, theorists, advocates, and jurists might work to develop a
coherent and workable theory of immigration exceptionalism. When they
do, the parameters and limitations developed in this Article will serve as
important benchmarks. For jurists, in particular, working toward doctrinal
coherence may be especially important. That is not to suggest that
immigration exceptionalism must be an all-or-nothing proposition. But the
lack of judicial reasons for the extant patchwork of mainstream and
exceptional doctrines is, itself, an undertheorized phenomenon that courts
may be best positioned to fix.
At the same time, however, jurists, advocates, and theorists might
consider whether coherence is even worth the candle. All else equal,
doctrinal coherence is generally something our system prizes. But, in
immigration, coherence can entail very different things. For instance, it can
mean coherence between immigration and the rest of constitutional law.
Alternatively, coherence might entail consistency within immigration
(which might entail across-the-board exceptionalism or normalization). As
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leading courts to assess potential conflicts between federal and state law without giving extra weight to
an overriding national interest in immigration regulation.”).
328

653

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

long as consequences matter, coherence—at either level—may be a value
worth considering, but only among other values.
Fifth, the foregoing triggers an overarching question of whether the
immigration system, as a whole, would be better off moving toward
exceptionalism or normalization. Future studies—empirical or
theoretical—might pursue which of these poles is preferable.
Finally, a perennial debate in immigration scholarship is whether
historic strands of immigration exceptionalism are dead or alive.330 Most
commonly, these diagnostic treatments focus on the plenary power doctrine
and the related exclusivity principle. Looking ahead, however, more
attention should be paid to whether new forms of immigration
exceptionalism are being born. Should the immigration system embrace
new forms of exceptionalism? If so, which ones? Why some but not others?
This Article’s core insights are directed at precisely these sorts of
issues. Emerging or new forms of immigration exceptionalism can have
any number of effects on the system as a whole. As explained and
illustrated throughout this Article, any form of exceptionalism might reify
rights exceptionalism—depending in part on underlying rationales. On the
other hand, new forms of exceptionalism might offset or compensate for
other forms of exceptionalism, both old and new.
CONCLUSION
Immigration exceptionalism has been, and will continue to be, a
centerpiece of immigration law and theory. Thus far, however, most
treatments of immigration exceptionalism have approached the concept in
disjointed and disaggregated ways. This Article’s key insight is that the
immigration system simply does not work that way. Scholars, advocates,
and jurists have a choice between context-specific approaches to
immigration exceptionalism on the one hand, and holistic treatments on the
other. This Article advances a positive case for the latter, and with it, a new
foundation on which to build.
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